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ABSTRACT
Recent advances in technology have significantly improved the accuracy of
genetic testing and analysis, and substantially reduced its cost, resulting in a
dramatic increase in the amountof genetic informationgenerated, analysed,
shared, and stored by diverse individuals and entities. Given the diversity of
actors and their interests, coupledwith thewide variety of ways genetic data
are held, it has been difficult to develop broadly applicable legal principles
for genetic privacy. This article examines the current landscape of genetic
privacy to identify the roles that the law does or should play, with a focus on
federal statutes and regulations, including the Health Insurance Portabil-
ity and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the Genetic Information Nondis-
crimination Act (GINA). After considering the many contexts in which is-
sues of genetic privacy arise, the article concludes that few, if any, applicable
legal doctrines or enactments provide adequate protection or meaningful
control to individuals over disclosures that may affect them.The article de-
scribes why it may be time to shift attention from attempting to control ac-
cess to genetic information to considering themore challenging question of
how these data can be used andunderwhat conditions, explicitly addressing
trade-offs between individual and social goods in numerous applications.
KEYWORDS: DNA, genetics, genomics, GINA, HIPAA, privacy
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2  The law of genetic privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
People often view genetic information about themselves as private. Each person’s
genome, or full complement of DNA, is unique,1 but the specific variants within an
individual’s genome may be widely shared with biological relatives or even across the
entire human population. This mixed character of the genome—as a uniquely indi-
vidual assemblage of widely shared common elements—imbues it with a dual pri-
vate and public significance that confounds any discussion of policy addressing genetic
privacy.
On one hand, DNA has been conceptualized as a unique identifier2 and a person’s
book of life,3 which provides insights intomany aspects of the person’s future, although
perhaps not as much as many people might think. This conceptualization leads many
people to want to control who has access to genetic information about them and drives
calls for strong privacy protection or even personal genetic data ownership. On the
other hand, genetic data are not limited to one individual, with information about one
person revealing information about the person’s close and distant biological relatives.
Only by studying genetic information frommany people can the significance of the in-
dividual’s variants be discerned.The importance of understanding the causes of health
and disease has led some to argue that people have some obligation to share data about
themselves for low-risk research.4 This public nature and value of the genome makes
it difficult to decide what level of control individuals should have and how to provide
appropriate privacy protections.
At the same time, the very concept of ‘privacy’ has evolved in recent decades and
a new model of privacy has gained ground. The traditional view of privacy as secrecy
or concealment—as a ‘right to be let alone’5—has grown increasingly strained in the
Information Age. The Internet and ubiquitous communication technologies facilitate
broad sharing of information, including highly personal information, often without
the individual’s knowledge or consent.6 A new theorization of privacy has emerged,
in which concealing one’s secrets ‘is less relevant than being in control of the dis-
tribution and use by others’7 of the data people generate in the course of seeking
healthcare, conducting consumer transactions, and going about their lives. ‘The leading
paradigm on the Internet and in the “real,”’ or off-line world, conceives of privacy as a
1 Even the genomes of monozygotic (‘identical’) twins often differ in some ways. See, eg F. Nipa Haque,
Irving I. Gottesman & Albert H.C. Wong, Not Really Identical: Epigenetic Differences in Monozygotic Twins
and Implications for Twin Studies in Psychiatry, 151C AM. J. MED. GENETICS PART C SEMIN. MED. GENETICS
136 (2009).
2 Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research Subjects and Reducing Burden,
Delay, andAmbiguity for Investigators, 76Fed.Reg. 143 (proposed July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 45C.F.R.
pts. 46, 160, 164; 21 C.F.R. pts. 50, 56).
3 FRANCISS.COLLINS, THELANGUAGEOFLIFE:DNAANDTHEREVOLUTION INPERSONALIZEDMEDICINE (2010).
4 Ruth R. Faden et al., An Ethics Framework for a Learning Healthcare System: A Departure from Traditional
Research Ethics and Clinical Ethics, 43 HASTINGS CTR. REP. S16, S23 (2013).
5 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis,The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1890).
6 Vera Bergelson, It’s Personal but Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in Personal Information, 37 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 379, 401–2 (2003);Daniel J. Solove,Conceptualizing Privacy, 90CALIF.L.REV. 1087, 1092–1126 (2002).
7 Bergelson, supra note 6, at 401 [quoting RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY ¶
16.02, at 16-5 (2001)].
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personal right to control theuseof one’s data’,8 including enjoying access andusing it by
oneself.9
Deciding how much control people should have over access to and use of genetic
data about themselves has taken on increased urgency in recent years. Until recently,
there simply was less genetic information to worry about, because a person’s genetic
makeup could be inferred only by studying his or her phenotypic characteristics and
family history. It was possible, for example, to tell something about people’s eye color
genes by looking at their eyes, but not whether they had a gene variant that modestly
elevated their cholesterol level or whether they were at increased risk of developing a
common complex disorder.
Dramatic advances in technology has now made it possible to examine DNA
directly with increasing accuracy and decreasing cost, thereby contributing to the
dramatic growth in genome-based approaches, such as exome- or genome-based
sequencing, which can provide dramatically more information than single-gene tests.
These genomic tests have already proven valuable in diagnosing disorders whose etiol-
ogy is unknown, as can be the case for some children with developmental disability or
critical illness as neonates.10 There is also growing interest in using genome-scale tests
to answer narrower clinical questions on the ground that these approaches are more
efficient than testing a more limited number of genes.11 But moving to genome-based
technologies has consequences for an individual’s privacy because having genomic data
makes it possible to examine all the genetic variants regardless of the original reason for
testing.
As this technology and our understanding of genomics have improved, a growing
number of individuals and entities seek access to individual genetic information. For
example, millions of people have pursued testing to learn about their ancestry and to
identify previously unknown relatives, endeavors that require access to the informa-
tion of others as well as their own. In addition, clinicians might seek the data to refine a
patient’s diagnosis or care. Biomedical researchersmightwant to examine genetic infor-
mation to understand the ways that genetic variation contributes to health and disease.
Life insurers might want to use this information for underwriting. Parties in toxic tort
cases might try to use this information to establish or rebut causation. Law enforce-
ment might want to use the information to identify victims of mass attacks or criminal
suspects.
Numerous studies show that many people are more comfortable sharing their ge-
netic data with physicians and researchers in the institution where they seek care than
8 Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 820 (2000).
9 See, eg U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Infor-
mation, 65 FED. REG. 82,462, 82,606 (Dec. 28, 2000) (noting, in the preamble to the original HIPAA Privacy
Rule, that various industry and standard-setting organizations have recognized the need for individual access,
stating that, ‘Patients’ confidence in the protection of their information requires that they have the means to
know what is contained in their records’).
10 Laurie D. Smith, Laurel K. Willig & Stephen F. Kingsmore,Whole-Exome Sequencing and Whole-Genome Se-
quencing in Critically Ill Neonates Suspected toHave Single-GeneDisorders, 6 COLDSPRINGHARBORPERSP.MED.
2 (2016).
11 Jonathan S. Berg, Muin J. Khoury & James P. Evans, Deploying Whole Genome Sequencing in Clinical Practice
and Public Health: Meeting the Challenge One Bin at a Time, 13 GENETICS MED. 499 (2011)
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4  The law of genetic privacy
with the government or commercial entities.12 People also vary widely in how much
they are concerned about genetic privacy13 and privacy in general.14
Given the diversity of actors and their interests, the increasing power of genetic
technologies, and the wide variety of ways these data are held, it is difficult to develop
broadly applicable legal principles for genetic privacy. As has been true since the earliest
debates about genetic privacy, which began decades ago,15 public policy often involves
balancing the rights of individuals to maintain the privacy of their genetic information
with the rights of other individuals and the public to access the information.The trade-
offs often implicate both personal and societal interests, which vary depending on the
context. Whether the state can conduct newborn screening for genetic disorders raises
different questions fromwhether an insurer can use genetic information for underwrit-
ing health, life, disability, or long-term care insurance, each of which presents its own
challenges. In addition, the wide variety of actors and locations are subject to different
regulatory schemes.
This article examines the landscape of genetic privacy to identify the roles the law
does or should play. Because of the complexity of genetic privacy law, it is infeasible to
address all of the issues in a single article. Consequently, the article does not address
in detail genetic privacy in reproductive genetic testing,16 human subjects research in-
volving genetics, state statutes and regulations pertaining to genetic privacy, and com-
mon law actions for invasion of privacy.The article’s primary focus is on federal statutes
and regulations. After considering themany contexts in which issues of genetic privacy
arise, the article concludes that few, if any, applicable legal doctrines or enactments pro-
vide adequate protection. For simplicity, and to acknowledge the deep roots of these
debates, the article refers to ‘genetic’ privacy, but it clearly contemplates and gives spe-
cial attention to the implications of the expanding role of genomics and associated
technologies.
II. CONCEPTIONS OF GENETIC PRIVACY
II.A. Dimensions of Genetic Privacy
In order to understand genetic privacy, it is necessary first to delve into the complex
concept of privacy.17 Privacy is a state of limited access to an individual or information
12 Nanibaa’A. Garrison et al., A Systematic Literature Review of Individuals’ Perspectives on Broad Consent and
Data Sharing in the United States, 18 GENETICS MED. 663, 668–9 (2016); C. Sanderson et al., Public Attitudes
Toward Consent and Data Sharing in Biobank Research: A Large Multi-site Experimental Survey in the US, 100
AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 414, 421 (2017).
13 Ellen W. Clayton et al., A Systematic Literature Review of Individuals’ Perspectives on Privacy and Genetic In-
formation in the United States, PLOS ONE, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0204417 (2018); Stacey
Pereira et al., Do Privacy and Security Regulations Need a Status Update? Perspectives from an Intergenerational
Study, PLOS ONE, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0184525 (2017).
14 Mary Madden, Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the Post-Snowden Era, PEW RES. CTR.,
http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/public-privacy-perceptions/ (2014).
15 PHILIP REILLY, GENETICS, LAW, AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND
CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENOMIC ERA (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997).
16 For recent discussions, see Josephine Johnston, RuthM.Farrell & Eric Parens, SupportingWomen’s Autonomy
in Prenatal Testing, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 505 (2017); Ruth M. Farrell &Megan A. Allyse, Key Ethical Issues
in Prenatal Genetics, 45 OBSTET. & GYNECOL. CLIN. 127 (2017).
17 Many other countries, especially those in the European Union, use the term ‘data protection’ as an omnibus
concept that includes privacy, confidentiality, security, and other elements.These concepts are at the heart of
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jlb/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jlb/lsz007/5489401 by Vanderbilt U
niversity Library user on 01 O
ctober 2019
The law of genetic privacy  5
about an individual.18 The right to privacy refers to the ethical and legal principles that
recognize the importance of limited access to an individual or information about an
individual.
Anita Allen has proposed four categories of privacy applicable towhat she terms ‘the
ambiguous concept’ of genetic privacy.
When used to label issues that arise in contemporary bioethics and public policy, ‘privacy’
generally refers to one of four categories of concern. They are: (1) informational privacy
concerns about access to personal information; (2) physical privacy concerns about ac-
cess to persons and personal spaces; (3) decisional privacy concerns about governmental
andother third-party interferencewith personal choices; and (4) proprietary privacy con-
cerns about the appropriation and ownership of interests in human personality.19
Informational privacy is a particularly important dimension of genetic privacy, and it
is the primary focus of this article. From the huge dataset that is every human’s genome
to family pedigrees and genetic test results, genetics is closely associated with informa-
tion.Genomics and related analytical approaches—such as proteomics,metabolomics,
transcriptomics, and epigenomics—greatly increase the amount of potential gene-
associated information about individuals. Often, genetic information is sensitive be-
cause it has implications for the current and future health of individuals and their family
members.The information may also have major social and economic consequences.20
Three other significant concepts within the realm of privacy and genetic privacy
are confidentiality, security, and anonymity.21 Confidentiality describes a situation in
which information is disclosed within a trusting relationship (eg physician–patient) on
the express or implied agreement that it will not be divulged to a third party without the
permissionof the sourceof the information.22 Confidentiality, applicable to thenondis-
closure of genetic information,23 is a foundational principle in the ethical codes ofmany
health professions and a key element of a wide range of laws.The duty to protect confi-
dentiality is not absolute; however, and in certain circumstances recognized by law or
the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation, which took effect in 2018. General Data Protec-
tion Regulation, 2018 O.J. (L 127), https://gdpr-info.eu (accessed Apr. 15, 2019). See generally Edward S.
Dove,TheEUGeneral Data Protection Regulation: Implications for International Scientific Research in the Digital
Era, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS, 1013−30 (2018).
18 ‘Physical and informational privacy practices serve to limit observation and disclosure deemed inimical to
well-being’. Anita L. Allen, Privacy in Health Care, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 2067 (WarrenThomas
Reich ed., 1995).
19 Anita L. Allen,Genetic Privacy: Emerging Concepts and Values, inGENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND
CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 31, 33 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997).
20 See infra Section V.
21 SeeBarthaMariaKnoppers&MadelaineSaginur,TheBabel ofGeneticDataTerminology, 23NATUREBIOTECH.
925, 925 (2005) (discussing the numerous terms used to describe measures to protect genetic information).
22 ‘Confidentiality concerns the communicationof private andpersonal information fromoneperson to another
where it is expected that the recipient of the information, such as a health professional, will not ordinarily dis-
close the confidential information to third persons’. William J. Winslade, Confidentiality, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF BIOETHICS at 452 (WarrenThomas Reich ed., 1995). See alsoMark A. Rothstein,Confidentiality, inMEDI-
CALETHICS: ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUESRAISED BY THECODES,OPINIONS, ANDSTATEMENTS 171 (Baruch A. Brody
et al. eds., 2001).
23 For a further discussion, see infra Section III.
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6  The law of genetic privacy
ethical codes, other interests may be paramount, such as the safety and health of third
parties.24
Security, in the informational sense, is an increasingly important concept in the digi-
tal age. It refers to a condition inwhich individuals or entitieswith appropriate authority
to access certain information are granted access to it, but those without such author-
ity are denied access. Security can be protected by various means, such as by training
employees, adopting administrative procedures for handling sensitive information, and
implementing technical access controls, including passwords and encryption.25
Anonymity is a form of privacy protection in which the identity of the source of cer-
tain health information is not obtained or is removed by researchers or other custodi-
ans of the information. Anonymization, deidentification, and similar measures are fre-
quently applied to genetic information in an effort to protect individual privacy while
retaining the scientific value of the information. The use of anonymized genetic infor-
mation raises two main concerns. First, technical methods may not be completely ef-
fective in preventing the reidentification of genetic information.26 Second, there is a
plausible argument that individuals’ interest in autonomy should afford them the op-
portunity to learn about and to control the use of even their anonymized health infor-
mation or biospecimens.27
No matter how people choose to define ‘privacy’, there is a widespread sentiment
among legal and ethics scholars that existing privacy laws do not provide as much pri-
vacy as many people expect or erroneously believe they have.28 US federal privacy laws
datingback to the early 1970s strike abalance that grants people somecontrol over their
data (through informed consent rights) while also allowing at least some unconsented
collection and use of people’s data (including their genetic information) for various
purposes that lawmakers consider socially beneficial.29 The ‘individual control’ these
laws provide is thus incomplete. In the 1970s, Congress commissioned a Privacy Pro-
tection StudyCommission (PPSC) to recommend appropriate privacy protections for
24 For example, laws requiring the reporting of infectious diseases or suspected cases of child abuse to appropri-
ate governmental agencies override confidentiality.
25 See 45 C.F.R. pt. 164 (2018) (security and privacy provision of the HIPAA Privacy Rule). See generally
Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health and Cyberspace: Protecting the Security of Electronic
Private Health Information, 48 B.C. L. REV. 331 (2007); Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the
Privacy and Confidentiality of Electronic Health Records, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV 681 (2007).
26 See Ellen Wright Clayton & Bradley Malin, Assessing Risks to Privacy in Biospecimen Research, in SPECIMEN
SCIENCE:ETHICSANDPOLICYIMPLICATIONS143(Holly FernandezLynch et al. eds., 2017); SaraReneeSavage,
Characterizing the Risks andHarms of Linking Genetic Information to Individuals, 15 IEEESECURITY&PRIVACY
14, 16 (2017). For a further discussion, see Part VI-A.
27 Jennifer Kulynych&Henry T. Greely,Clinical Genomics, Big Data, and ElectronicMedical Records: Reconciling
Patient Rights with Research When Privacy and Science Collide, J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 94 (2017); Mark A. Roth-
stein, Is Deidentification Sufficient to Protect Health Privacy in Research?, 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 3 (2010).
28 See generally SARAH E. IGO, THE KNOWN CITIZEN: A HISTORY OF PRIVACY INMODERN AMERICA (2018).
29 See, eg the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (enumerating permissible disclosure of
people’s credit information and conditions for such disclosures); Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)
(requiring governmental agencies to seek consent prior to disclosure of people’s personal data stored in gov-
ernmental databases, but then allowing various enumerated exceptions to the consent requirement); HIPAA
Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (allowing unconsented use and disclosure of people’s health and genetic
information for an enumerated list of purposes—such as public health, law enforcement and judicial uses,
and research subject to IRB or privacy board approval).
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many types of data.The PPSC’s 1977 report30 acknowledged that unconsented uses of
people’s data, under certain circumstances, can be ethically justified, but it cautioned
that if data cannot be ‘totally protected’ against unconsented access by others, people
face privacy risks and need to be able to access their data themselves in order to as-
sess and manage those risks.31 Accordingly, many privacy laws, both in the USA and
elsewhere, offer individual access rights as a core part of their scheme of privacy protec-
tions.32 As a practical matter, however, healthcare institutions do not always provide
patients with access to their medical records in a timely manner,33 and patients often
encounter difficulty amending errors in their records.34
II.B. Genetic Exceptionalism
One of the earliest controversies surrounding genetic privacy in the academic literature
and policy domain was whether genetic information should be regarded as merely an-
other type of health informationorwhether certain distinctive characteristics of genetic
information demand separate and more protective treatment. Among the allegedly
unique aspects of genetic information is the tremendous amount of information con-
tained in DNA, its immutability, its potential use as a unique identifier, and its implica-
tions for family members and others with a similar geographic ancestry.
Thomas Murray, recalling a debate in the 1980s about whether HIV information
was unique (termed ‘HIV exceptionalism’), coined the term ‘genetic exceptionalism’
in reference to the controversy surroundingwhether genetic information—at that time
typically referring primarily toMendelian or single-gene disorders—should be treated
separately.35 Murray also recognized that themaindifferencebetweengenetic andnon-
genetic information is thatmanymembersof thepublic regard anything ‘genetic’ as spe-
cial. ‘Genetic information is special because we are inclined to treat it as mysterious, as
having exceptional potency or significance, not because it differs in some fundamental
way from all other sorts of information about us’.36 A practical problem with the sepa-
rate treatment of genetic information is the difficulty in defining and separating it from
30 PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY (July, 1977),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/49602NCJRS.pdf (accessed Apr. 15, 2019).
31 Id. at 299.SeeMargaretO’Mara,TheEnd of PrivacyBegan in the 1960s,N.Y.TIMES,Dec. 6, 2018, atA31 (stating
that as early as the 1960sCongress adopted the policy of pushing for data transparency, including sharing data
with the person the data describe, rather than restrictions on sharing people’s data with third parties).
32 See, eg the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(1) (granting an individual right of access to certain data
held in governmental databases); HIPAA Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (granting an individual right of
access to certain data held by HIPAA-covered entities). See also European Union General Data Protection
Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/679), Art. 15 (providing an individual access right).
33 SeeCarolynT. Lye et al.,Assessment of USHospital Compliance with Regulations for Patients’ Requests forMedi-
cal Records, 1 JAMANETWORKOPEN. e183014 (2018), DOI:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2018.3014 (finding
widespread noncompliance with federal regulations by 83 hospitals studied).
34 Under theHIPAAPrivacyRule, individualsmay request that their health records be revised or supplemented,
but covered entities are not required to do so. 45C.F.R. § 164.526. As a practicalmatter, covered entities often
fail to grant such requests by patients.
35 Thomas H. Murray, Genetic Exceptionalism and ‘Future Diaries’: Is Genetic Information Different from Other
Medical Information?, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY ANDCONFIDENTIALITY IN THEGENETIC ERA
(Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997). See also Nicolas P. Terry, Big Data Proxies and Health Privacy Exceptionalism,
24 HEALTHMATRIX 65 (2014) (discussing the broader ‘health privacy exceptionalism’).
36 Murray, supra note 35, at 71. Although Mendelian conditions, especially Huntington disease, were cited ex-
tensively in the literature in the 1990s as justifying genetic exceptionalism, it is not a good example upon
which to construct an approach to genetic ethics and policy. For example, few other genetic conditions share
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8  The law of genetic privacy
other medical information in health records.37 Separate treatment of genetic informa-
tion also contributes to genetic reductionism38 and genetic determinism,39 thereby in-
creasing rather than reducing the seeming importance of genetic information and the
stigma of genetic disorders.
As with other types of information in emerging medical fields, many of the prob-
lems associated with the use of genetic information arise from two time lags. First is the
time lag between the discovery of a genetic basis for a condition and the development
of therapies to prevent, treat, or cure the disorder. Thus, genetic information may in-
dicate a risk, such as for Alzheimer’s disease, about which little or nothing can be done
to prevent or ameliorate the condition. Second is the time lag between a genetic test
that identifies the increased risk of disease in a particular individual and the onset of
symptoms. During this time period, when the individual is inmedical limbo, numerous
entitieswith aneconomic interest in the individual’s futurehealth, such as various insur-
ance companies, are inclined to use the genetic information to limit their risk. Neither
of these characteristics is unique to genetics.
Although most commentators have been critical of genetic exceptionalism,40 virtu-
ally all of the recent legislation enacted to deal with genetic privacy and genetic dis-
crimination has been genetic-specific. One of the main reasons for this choice is that
genetic-specific laws are necessarily narrower in scope and are thus more likely to gar-
ner political support. For example, as early as the 1970s, a few states began enacting
laws prohibiting some types of genetic discrimination in health insurance.41 These laws
provided additional protections to those afforded by state medical privacy laws, which
the characteristics ofHuntington disease, which is an autosomal dominant, progressive, neurological disorder
with nearly complete penetrance, adult onset, and usually resulting in death within 12 to 15 years of onset.
Jean Paul G. Vansattel &Marian DiFiglia,Huntington Disease, 57 J. NEUROPATHOL. & EXP. NEUROL. 369, 369
(1998).
37 For example, family health history information often contains genetic information and is widely dispersed in
health records. Similarly, patients’ own histories may imply much about their genetic makeup.
38 ‘Genetic reductionism, understood ontologically, is the position that organisms consist of nothing but genes’.
RobertWachboit,Genetic Determinism, Genetic Reductionism, and Genetic Essentialism, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ETHICAL,LEGAL, ANDPOLICY ISSUES INBIOTECHNOLOGY 353, 354 (ThomasH.Murray&Maxwell J.Mehlman,
eds., 2000). See also RichardM. Lerner, Eliminating Genetic Reductionism fromDevelopmental Science, 12 RES.
HUMAN DEV. 178 (2015).
39 ‘The phrase “genetic determinism” would, strictly speaking, mean that every event has a genetic cause that
is sufficient for that event’s occurring’. Wachbroit, supra note 38, at 353. See also Emily Willoughby et al.,
Free Will, Determinism, and Intuitive Judgments about the Heritability of Behavior, BEHAV. GENETICS (2018),
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10519-018-9931-1.
40 See LawrenceO.Gostin& JamesG.Hodge, Jr,Genetic Privacy and the Law:AnEnd toGenetics Exceptionalism,
40 JURIMETRICS J. 21, 23 (1999); Deborah Hellman,What Makes Genetic Discrimination Exceptional?, 29 AM.
J.L.&MED. 77, 83 (2003); TrudoLemmens, Selective Justice, Genetic Discrimination, and Insurance: ShouldWe
Single Out Genes in Our Laws?, 45 MCGILL L.J. 347, 369ffi76 (2002); Mark A. Rothstein &Mary R. Anderlik,
What Is Genetic Privacy, and When and How Should It Be Prevented?, 3 GENETICS MED. 354 (2001); Sonia M.
Suter,The Allure and Peril of Genetics Exceptionalism: Do We Need Special Genetics Legislation?, 79 WASH. U.
L.Q. 669 (2001). For publications proposing separate treatment of genetics, see GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL.,
THE GENETIC PRIVACY ACT AND COMMENTARY pt. D, § 131(e)(1)(B) (1995); Colin S. Diver & JaneMaslow
Cohen, Genophobia: What Is Wrong with Genetic Discrimination?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1454ffi59 (2001);
RobertM. Green&A.MathewThomas,DNA: Five Distinguishing Features for Policy Analysis, 11HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 571, 572 (1998).
41 In the 1970s, Florida, FLA. STAT.§448.075(2018); Louisiana, LA. STAT.ANN.§§23:1001 to :1004(2018); and
North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.1 (2018) enacted laws prohibiting genetic discrimination in health
insurance. In 1981, New Jersey enacted a broader law prohibiting discrimination based on an individual’s
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also have numerous exceptions.42 Congress enacted the Genetic Information Nondis-
crimination Act (GINA) in 2008,43 but its prohibition against genetic discrimination
in health insurance applies only to asymptomatic individuals. It was not until 2010
that Congress prohibited all health-based discrimination in health insurance when it
enacted the Affordable Care Act.44 This universally applicable nondiscrimination law
provides comprehensive protections and avoids coverage gaps that characterize genetic
nondiscrimination laws.
From a policy perspective, advocates and elected officials often have to decide
whether to accept limited, genetic-specific legislation or to hold out for the possibility
of a broader statute. On balance, less protective genetic laws are better than no legisla-
tion at all only if the enactments provide some clear improvement over the status quo,
are drafted carefully to avoid unintended consequences, including reifying genetic ex-
ceptionalism, do not delay enactment of more comprehensive legislation, and are not
presented to the public as a complete answer to the problem.45 Thus, advocates and
policy-makers often are forced into an unappealing choice between limited, genetic-
specific legislation or no legislation at all. Whether it is better to enact weak genetic
privacy protections, as opposed to holding out for broader and more forceful privacy
legislation, depends on several factors. For example, will passage of weak and incom-
plete genetic privacy protections reduce pressure for the stronger protection or lull
the public into a false belief that their genetic information is better protected than it
actually is?
III. GENETIC INFORMATION IN HEALTHCARE
Genetic information connected to personal identifiers is generated and used in a vari-
ety of contexts that may or may not be health-related—eg, clinical genetics, direct-to-
consumer (DTC) testing,46 and forensics.47 Genetic information is an essential clinical
tool in an increasing number of medical specialties, including clinical genetics, oncol-
ogy, obstetrics, neurology, pediatrics, and behavioral health. As clinicians obtain, aggre-
gate, store, use, and disclose more genetic information, there is a greater possibility of
breaches of privacy, confidentiality, and security. Some scenarios where such breaches
may occur include the following: (1) genetic information is disclosed to or accessed by
healthcare providers without the authority or legitimate need to see it; (2) the scope
of the genetic information obtained and disclosed is beyond that needed for a legiti-
mate healthcare purpose; and (3) genetic information is used for a purpose unrelated
‘atypical hereditary cellular or blood type’, defined to include sickle cell trait, hemoglobin C trait, thalassemia
trait, Tay Sachs trait, or cystic fibrosis trait. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(y) (1981).
42 Leslie E. Wolf et al.,TheWeb of Legal Protections for Participants in Genomic Research (forthcoming 2019).
43 Pub. L. 110–233, 122 Stat. 881 (May 21, 2008), 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff (2018).
44 42U.S.C. §§18001–18122 (2018).TheHealth InsurancePortability andAccountabilityAct, initially enacted
in 1996, prohibited exclusion fromemployer-sponsored group health plans on the basis of genetic conditions,
but its protectionwas limited by its failure to prohibit differential rates.Other laws, such as theAmericanswith
Disabilities Act, also provide some protection to those who are severely affected by genetic disorders. Ellen
W. Clayton,Why the Americans with Disabilities Act Matters for Genetics, 313 JAMA 2225, 2225–6 (2014).
45 Mark A. Rothstein,Genetic Exceptionalism and Legislative Pragmatism, 35 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 27, 31 (2005).
46 See infra Section IV.
47 See infra Section V. See infra Section VI for a discussion of the issue of the use of data from identifiers that
have been removed.
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to the disclosure.48 Each of these, and many other situations in clinical settings, raises
important legal and ethical issues.49
Uses anddisclosures of health (including genetic) information inhealthcare settings
raise several issues, including whether consent or authorization is required, howmuch
andwhat typeof information can lawfully bedisclosed, andwhichmembers of the treat-
ment or research team should have access to which information. Whereas individuals
are often concerned about discrimination when their health information is disclosed
beyond healthcare settings, in healthcare settings their main concerns are protecting
their privacy, autonomy, and dignity. Even though these concerns may seem abstract
or indirect, many individuals regard them as very important, and concerns about these
issues often influence a patient’s behavior and health outcomes, such as where patients
limit disclosures of sensitive information to their healthcare providers to protect their
privacy.50
III.A. HIPAAPrivacy Rule
Most disclosures in healthcare settings are by ‘covered entities’ under the Health In-
surance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)51 and its Privacy Rule.52 HIPAA
was enacted in 1996, primarily as an insurance statute, to facilitate the movement of
employees from one employer to another without interruption or loss of employer-
sponsored group health coverage for the employee or the employee’s dependents. Its
role as privacy legislation was something of an afterthought. Congress added ‘Adminis-
trative Simplification’ provisions53 toHIPAA during the legislative process tomandate
the use of standard electronic formats in the submission of health insurance claims;
these provisions addressed privacy only insofar as needed to minimize privacy risks re-
lated to the electronic filing of insurance claims. Thus, the HIPAA statute gave the US
Department of Health andHuman Services (HHS) the jurisdiction to regulate entities
that provide healthcare or pay for it (such as insurers) but gave HHS no jurisdiction
to regulate the multitude of other private companies and institutions (eg drug manu-
facturers, research institutions that provide no healthcare services, companies that sell
fitness-tracking devices, DTC genetic testing services, and many others) that—in our
current times—use and store people’s health and genetic data in ways that affect their
privacy.
Congress understood that the HIPAA statute did not grant HHS the jurisdiction it
really needed tobe an effective health or genetic privacy regulator. Accordingly,HIPAA
48 As discussed below, under theHIPAAPrivacyRule, disclosures of protected health information for treatment
need not be limited in scope and do not require consent or authorization.
49 Improper disclosures and uses of genetic information also may take place in research settings, such as where
(1) genetic information is used for research without consent or beyond the bounds of the consent; (2) ge-
netic information specifically stored in a deidentified form is reidentifiedwithout authorization or a legitimate
purpose; (3) genetic information is used for research that is objectionable to the individual; and (4) genetic
information is used for research with the potential to cause group harms.
50 See Andrea Gurmankin Levy et al., Prevalence of and Factors Associated with Patient Nondisclo-
sure of Medically Relevant Information to Clinicians, 1 JAMA NETW. OPEN. e185293 (2018),
DOI:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2018.5293 (reporting on a survey showing that various privacy con-
cerns caused many patients to avoid telling clinicians information about their health).
51 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-300gg-2 (2018).
52 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 162, 164 (2018).
53 See the HIPAA statute, §§ 261–264 (enacting a new part C of title IX of the Social Security Act).
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envisioned thatCongresswould subsequently enact broadnational healthprivacy legis-
lation byAugust 21, 1999.54 HIPAAgaveHHS the authority to promulgate theHIPAA
Privacy Rule only if Congress failed to legislate by that date.55 As events unfolded,
Congress did not enact the new privacy legislation and it fell on HHS to do the best
it could with the limited jurisdiction available under theHIPAA statute. Consequently,
the Privacy Rule applies only to four types of HIPAA-covered entities involved in the
payment chain of healthcare: (1) healthcare providers that transmit any health infor-
mation in electronic form in connection with a covered transaction; (2) health plans,
including a health insurer, HMO, Medicare or Medicaid program, or other entity that
provides or pays the costs of medical care; (3) health clearinghouses, public or pri-
vate entities, including a billing service or health informationmanagement system, that
process health information into a standard format for billing purposes; and (4) busi-
ness associates of these entities, including individuals or entities that perform or as-
sist in billing, management, administration, or other functions regulated by the Privacy
Rule.56 The Privacy Rule was never intended to be a comprehensive health privacy reg-
ulation, but it has assumed such a role by default because of Congress’s failure to enact
more sweeping and rigorous health and genetic privacy laws and regulations.57
Other than a definitional provision58 that Congress ordered HHS to add to the Pri-
vacy Rule under GINA,59 a provision dealing with deidentification,60 and two pro-
visions dealing with health plans,61 the Privacy Rule does not contain any special
54 HIPAA statute, § 264(c).
55 Id.
56 Id. § 160.103.
57 The 2013 and 2014 amendments to the Privacy Rule incorporated provisions mandated by the Health Infor-
mationTechnology forEconomic andClinicalHealthAct (HITECHAct),AmericanRecovery andReinvest-
ment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, tit. XII, 123 Stat. 115, 203–226, and the Genetic Information Nondis-
crimination Act (GINA). Another shortcoming of the Privacy Rule is that it does not provide for private
actions to redress harms caused by violations. The Privacy Rule merely provides that a person who believes
a covered entity is not complying with applicable requirements of the Privacy Rule may file a complaint with
the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 45 C.F.R. § 160.306 (2018).
58 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2018).
59 See GINA § 102 [amending the Public Health Service Act at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(d)(16) to define ‘ge-
netic information’ very broadly as including ‘with respect to any individual, information about – (i) such in-
dividual’s genetic tests, (ii) the genetic tests of family members of such individual, and (iii) the manifesta-
tion of a disease or disorder in family members of such individual’ and further including ‘genetic services and
participation in genetic research’]. See also id. at § 300gg-91(d)(17) (defining ‘genetic test’ as meaning ‘an
analysis of humanDNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or metabolites, that detects genotypes, mutations, or
chromosomal changes’ and thus clearly including non-clinically-significant information, such as raw genomic
data, within the scope of information included in GINA’s definition of ‘genomic information’) and see id.
at § 300gg-91(d)(18) [defining ‘genetic services’ as including genetic tests and ‘genetic counseling (includ-
ing obtaining, interpreting, or assessing genetic information)’ and genetic information, such that information
from testing, assessing, and counseling occurring during the course of genetic research is included in GINA’s
broad definition of ‘genetic information’] and see GINA § 105 (adding a new § 1180 to the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d-9, providing that ‘[t]he Secretary shall revise the HIPAA privacy regulation’ so that
‘[g]enetic information shall be treated as health information described in section 1320d(4)(B) of this title’,
which was the section of the Social Security Act added by the 1996HIPAA statute in whichCongress defined
the ‘health information’ that is subject to HIPAA’s privacy protections). And see GINA § 105.
60 Id. § 164.514(g).
61 Id. § 164.502(a)(5)(i); § 164.520(b)(1)(iii)(C).
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provisions for genetic information.62 Under GINA, genetic information is deemed to
be ‘health information’ that is protected by the Privacy Rule63 even if the genetic in-
formation is not clinically significant and would not be viewed as health information
for other legal purposes. In other words, the Privacy Rule rejects genetic exceptional-
ism and places genetic information under the ordinary protections of the HIPAA Pri-
vacy Rule.64 The Privacy Rule provides that a covered entity need not obtain consent
or authorization from the individual for uses and disclosures of protected health infor-
mation (PHI)65 (individually identifiable health information) for treatment, payment,
or healthcare operations.66 A covered entity is merely required to include information
about its uses and disclosures in a notice of privacy practices provided to all individ-
uals.67 The Privacy Rule also has glaring gaps in its framework for keeping people in-
formed about who has been given access to their genetic information. For example,
when a person’s genetic information is disclosed in a deidentified format, the Privacy
Rule’s ‘accounting of disclosures’ provisions68 do not require covered entities to tell the
individual about the disclosure, even though deidentified genetic information is poten-
tially reidentifiable.
An important privacy-enhancing element of the PrivacyRule is theminimumneces-
saryprovision,which states that uses anddisclosures ofPHI for payment andhealthcare
operationsmust be limited to ‘the amount reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose
of the disclosure’.69 This provision, however, is not applicable to disclosures for treat-
ment.70 Furthermore, for treatment, payment, and healthcare operations, there is no
requirement that covered entities use and disclose PHI in the least identifiable form
consistent with legal requirements or the purpose of the use or disclosure.71
Besides the HIPAA Privacy Rule, several states have enacted ‘genetic privacy’ laws,
which vary widely in their applicability and stringency. For example, some of these laws
62 Only psychotherapy notes receive special treatment in the Privacy Rule. Separately maintained notes of pri-
vate communication are not considered part of the designated record set that may be disclosed for treatment,
payment, or healthcare operations. Id. § 164.501.
63 See GINA § 105, supra note 59.
64 Id. § 164.103. See the Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification
Rules, 78 FED. REG. 5566, 5661 (2013) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
65 Protected health information generally includes individually identifiable health information. 45 C.F.R. §
160.103 (2018).
66 Id. § 164.502(a)(1)(ii). The Privacy Rule defines treatment, payment, and healthcare operations quite
broadly, and therefore covered entities may use and disclose numerous types of PHI without consent or ad-
ditional notice to the individual beyond the notice of privacy practices.
67 Id. § 164.520.
68 45 C.F.R. § 164.528 (2018).
69 Id. § 164.514(d)(3)(i).
70 See Julie L. Agris, Extending the Minimum Necessary Standard to Uses and Disclosures for Treatment, 42 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 263, 264 (2014). Despite its manifest inadequacies, the Privacy Rule has some value, includ-
ing the following: (1) it provides individuals with a right of access to their health records, id. § 164.524, an
especially valuable provision in states lacking similar state legislation; (2) it requires authorizations for uses
and disclosures of PHI in fundraising, id. § 164.514(f), marketing, id. § 164.508(a)(3), and most research,
id. § 164.512(i); and (3) it has substantial symbolic value by declaring the importance of health information
privacy and security, eg, banning healthcare providers from discussing patients’ health information in public
areas.
71 See Mark A. Rothstein,The End of the HIPAA Privacy Rule?, 44 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 352, 353 (2016) (advo-
cating for adoption of a ‘least identifiable form’ requirement under the Privacy Rule).
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require informed consent for genetic testing, regulate access to genetic information, or
provide that genetic information is the property of the individual.72
III.B. GINA
In 2008, after 13 years of contentious congressional deliberation, GINA was over-
whelmingly passed by Congress and signed into law by President George W. Bush.73
Unlike other civil rights laws, GINA was not enacted to remedy ongoing discrimina-
tion; rather, it was intended to preempt discrimination that was feared, but not well
documented as yet occurring.74 Section 2(5) of GINA confirms that the purpose of
the law is ‘to fully protect the public from discrimination and to allay their concerns
about the potential for discrimination, thereby allowing individuals to take advantage
of genetic testing, technologies, research, and new therapies’. GINA’s two main titles
prohibit discrimination based on genetic information in health insurance (Title I) and
employment (Title II), but the value of this legislation has been a source of some dis-
pute.75
Although GINA is best known for its provisions prohibiting discrimination based
on genetic information, it also contains provisions related to privacy. Section 202(b)
of GINA prohibits employers from requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic infor-
mation with respect to an employee (including an applicant) or a family member of
the employee. Similar provisions limiting the acquisition of genetic information are in-
cluded in Title I dealing with nondiscrimination in health insurance and health benefit
plans.76
Section 105 ofGINA also provides that genetic information—as broadly defined by
GINA77—‘shall be treated as health information’ underHIPAA, thereby extending the
HIPAA Privacy Rule to genetic information regardless of whether it is ‘health informa-
tion in the ordinary sense of this word’.78 This seeming expansion of the Privacy Rule is
72 Genome Statute and Regulation Database, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST. (NHGRI), https://www.genome.
gov/policyethics/legdatabase/pubsearchresult.cfm (accessed Nov. 2, 2018).
73 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff.
74 See Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act,
63 VAND. L. REV. 439 (2010).
75 SeeMark A. Rothstein,GINA at Ten and the Future of Genetic Nondiscrimination Law, 48HASTINGSCTR. REP.
No. 3, at 5 (2018).
76 GINA, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 101(d), 122 Stat. 881, 884–5 (2008) (prohibiting acquisition of genetic infor-
mationbyERISA-qualifiedhealth plans); §102(d)(2)(A), 122Stat. at 896 (prohibiting acquisitionof genetic
information by group health plans or group health insurers); § 102(d)(2)(B), 122 Stat. at 896 (prohibiting
acquisition of genetic information in individual health insurance); § 103(d), 122 Stat. at 898–9 (amending
the Internal Revenue Code to prohibit acquisition of genetic information with regard to group premiums); §
104(b)(2), 122 Stat. at 901 (prohibiting acquisition of genetic information in regard toMedigap policies).
77 GINA § 102, supra note 59.
78 The original HIPAA Privacy Rule, which became effective in 2003–04, only protected ‘health information’ as
defined by Section 1171 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d(4). This implied that genetic infor-
mation was protected by the Privacy Rule if it was ‘(A) created or received by a health care provider, health
plan, public health authority, employer, life insurer, school or university, or health care clearinghouse; and
(B) relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an individual, the provi-
sion of health care to an individual, or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care
to an individual’. Non-medical genetic information (such as forensic identifiers or variant data having no es-
tablished clinical significance) seemingly was not protected by the Privacy Rule. When Congress enacted
GINA, Congress defined ‘genetic information’ broadly, as discussed earlier in note 59. See the Public Health
Service Act § 2791(d)(16), codified at 42 U.S.C. 300gg–91(d)(16) (defining genetic information as
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subject to important limitations. First, as noted above, the Privacy Rule only applies to
covered entities in the healthcare payment chain, and it does not apply to many other
entities that acquire, store, use, or disclose genetic information, such as insurers other
than health insurers. It also does not generally apply toDTCgenetic testing companies,
including ancestry testing companies.The second limitation is that thePrivacyRule no-
toriously contains numerous exceptions to its individual authorization requirements,
discussed below.Third, many observers view its protections as inadequate because it is
enforceable only byHHS’s Office for Civil Rights and does not create a private right of
action on behalf of the person whose data are disclosed.79 Therefore, the nominal pri-
vacy protection afforded to genetic information in the possession of HIPAA-covered
entities does not fully address the need for genetic privacy protections.
III.C. ACMGList
One of the most controversial issues surrounding disclosure of genetic information in
healthcare settings involves what genetic information healthcare providers (eg clinical
geneticists, genetic counselors) can and should look for and share with their patients
beyond that needed to address the patients’ immediate clinical question. A key issue
is whether there is a professional obligation to provide secondary findings of genome
sequencing for a predetermined set of gene variants. The American College of Med-
ical Genetics and Genomics (ACMG) originally adopted the position that, because
of the significance of certain results, it is mandatory that professionals performing the
sequencing, interpretation, or disclosure of the results in clinical settings include 57
medically actionable genes, regardless of the wishes of the patient or ordering physi-
cian, or their pertinence to the patient’s clinical problem.80 This position was widely
criticized as violating patient autonomy and clinician discretion.81 The ACMG subse-
quently amended its policy to provide that patients could decline to receive secondary
results.82
III.D. Informing At-Risk Relatives
A related issue involves the ethical and legal obligations of clinicians to offer informa-
tion about a patient’s diagnosis of a gene-mediated disorder or the results of a genetic
including information about a person’s genetic tests, tests of family members, and manifest disease in family
members, and including genetic services and participation in genetic research). GINA added a new Section
1180 to the Social SecurityAct, 42U.S.C.A. § 1320d-9, which deems all such ‘genetic information’ tomeet the
definition of ‘health information’, for purposes of the HIPAA Privacy Rule. After GINA, even non-clinically
significant genetic information, such as forensic data, is treated as ‘health information’ for purposes of be-
ing protected under the Privacy Rule, even if it would not be considered ‘health information’ in other legal
contexts.
79 45 C.F.R. § 160.306 (2018). See also Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 571-72 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding, in the
first federal appellate decision to address this issue, that the Privacy Rule does not create a private right of
action).
80 Robert C. Green et al., ACMG Recommendations for Reporting of Incidental Findings in Clinical Exome and
Genome Sequencing, 15 GENETICS MED. 565, 569–573 (2013).
81 See Wylie Burke et al., Recommendations for Returning Genomic Incidental Findings? We Need to Talk!, 15
GENETICSMED. 854, 855 (2013); Lainie F. Ross et al.,Mandatory Extended Searches in All Genome Sequencing:
“Incidental Findings,” Patient Autonomy, and Shared Decision Making, 310 JAMA 367, 368 (2013).
82 S. S. Kalia et al.,Recommendations for Reporting of Secondary Findings inClinical Exome andGenome Sequencing,
2016 Update (ACMG SFv.2.0): A Policy Statement of the American College of Medical Genetics and Genomics,
19 GENETICS MED. 249, 250 (2017).
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test to at-risk family members. There is widespread agreement that clinicians should
advise their patients about the importance for their relatives of significant diagnostic or
predictive genetic information. Ideally, the clinician would encourage disclosure and
offer to assist the patient in this process, but there has beendisagreement aboutwhether
clinicians have a duty to contact and offer the results to relatives when the patient re-
fuses and does not authorize the clinician to contact them. A much-discussed judicial
opinion suggested that there might be a legal duty for a physician tomake these disclo-
sures to a patient’s relatives,83 and a guidance document from the American Society of
HumanGenetics stated that disclosure is appropriate in certain highly unusual circum-
stances.84 Nevertheless, bothof these sources predated the2003 compliancedate of the
HIPAAPrivacyRule, which prohibits nonconsensual disclosure of genetic information
to relatives of a patient.85 Furthermore, imposing such a dutymight discourage individ-
uals from obtaining genetic testing, cause an irreparable rift between patients and their
healthcare provider, prove to be burdensome and infeasible in identifying and contact-
ing the patient’s relatives, and result in harm by offering to disclose sensitive health in-
formation that the relatives might not want to receive. Therefore, as a matter of ethics
and law, clinicians are neither required nor permitted to inform the genetically at-risk
relatives of their patients without the consent or authorization of their patient or their
83 Safer v. Estate of Pack, 677A.2d 1188 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 683 A.2d 1163 (N.J. 1996).The
holding in this case has never been cited with approval and was severely limited by theNew Jersey legislature.
See N.J. REV. STAT. § 10:5-47 (2018).
84 American Society ofHumanGenetics Social Issues Subcommittee on Familial Disclosure,Professional Disclo-
sure of Familial Genetic Information, 62AM. J.HUM.GENETICS 474, 474 (1998).The exceptional circumstances
justifying an otherwise impermissible disclosure are described as follows: Disclosure should be permissible
where attempts to encourage disclosure on the part of the patient have failed; where the harm is highly likely
to occur and is serious and foreseeable; where the at-risk relative (s) is identifiable; and where either the dis-
ease is preventable/treatable or medically accepted standards indicate that early monitoring will reduce the
genetic risk.Id. at 474.
85 TheHIPAAPrivacyRule contains an exception that permits the following disclosure: ‘Uses and disclosures to
avert a serious threat to health or safety’. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(j) (2018).This provision was intended to apply
to situations, such as theTarasoff case,where an individual disclosed tohis psychotherapist that he intended to
kill a female acquaintance. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 339 (Cal. 1976). See Office
for Civil Rights, Department of Health and Human Services, FAQ: Does HIPAA permit a doctor to contact
a patient’s family or law enforcement if the doctor believes that the patient might hurt herself or someone
else? https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/2096/does-hipaa-permit-doctor-contact-patients-
family-or-law-enforcement-if-doctor-believes-patient.html. (‘The Privacy Rule permits a healthcare provider
to disclose necessary information about a patient to law enforcement, familymembers of the patient, or other
persons, when the provider believes the patient presents a serious and imminent threat to self or others’.).
See alsoMark A. Rothstein, Tarasoff Duties after Newtown, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 104 (2014).Therefore, the
‘serious threat to health or safety’ exception does not apply to warnings by a healthcare provider to a patient’s
relatives regarding their genetic risk. In 2013, theOffice for Civil Rights of theDepartment ofHealth andHu-
man Services issued the following interpretation: ‘Health care providersmay share genetic information about
an individual with providers treating family members of the individual who are seeking to identify their own
genetic risks, provided that the individual has not agreed to a restriction on such disclosure’. Modifications to
the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement and Breach Notification Rules, 78 FED. REG. 5566, 5668 (2013).
Although this interpretation permits the release of sensitive information without the consent of the patient,
the interpretation is limited. Healthcare providers are not required to make such disclosures, and they may
make them only to another healthcare provider, and only in response to an inquiry by another healthcare
provider.
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patient’s personal representative.86 The disclosure of research results raises similar is-
sues.87
IV. GENETIC INFORMATION IN DTC GENETIC TESTING
Outside the healthcare setting, millions of people now obtain DTC genetic testing for
a wide range of purposes, some of which can impinge on their privacy interests or the
privacy interests of others. Companies now purport to provide genetic insights into
health, ancestry and genealogy, family relationships, and lifestyle choices.88 They offer
advice about using genetic test results to guide choices about food and dieting, selec-
tion of sports purportedly based on physiologic traits correlated with athletic ability, or
even how to pick a partner or where to travel.Themajority of these companies do their
own genetic testing, but a few ask customers to upload test results they have obtained
elsewhere for further analysis.
Themost prevalent categories ofDTCgenetic tests consist of those designed to pro-
vide insights into ancestry and family relationships.89 Although some people seek pri-
marily to learn about their ancestral origins, others hope to find blood relatives whom
they had not previously known about. Still others have desires that may be more dis-
ruptive, such as to identify the birth parents of a child who was adopted, or a gamete
donor,90 whichmay lead to unwanted contact,91 or to identify the parentage of a child,
which may be done surreptitiously and the results of which can have significant legal
consequences for children and adults. All of these efforts to define biological relation-
ships require people to share their genetic data.
Companies are also beginning to provide genetic tests that can be broadly under-
stood as health-related, directly to the consumer and without the involvement of a
healthcare provider. Recent regulatory developments have been driven largely by the
Food andDrugAdministration (FDA) and 23andMe, which became the first company
authorized tomarket aDTCcarrier test for BloomSyndrome in 2015.92 23andMe sub-
sequently obtained authorization to market Genetic Health Risk (GHR) tests for 10
86 See Mark A. Rothstein, Reconsidering the Duty to Warn Genetically At-Risk Relatives, 19 GENETICS MED. 285,
288–9 (2018).
87 See R.R. Fabsitz et al., Ethical and Practical Guidelines for Reporting Research Results to Study Participants: Up-
dated Guidelines from a National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute Working Group, 3 CIRC. & CARDIOVASC.
GENET. 574, 574ffi580 (2010); SusanM. Wolf et al., Returning a Research Participant’s Genomic Results to Rel-
atives: Analysis and Recommendations, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 440, 445–6, 451 (2015).
88 See James W. Hazel & Christopher Slobogin,Who Knows What, and When?: A Survey of the Privacy Policies
Proffered by U.S. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Companies, 28 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 47 (2018);
Andelka M. Phillips, Only a Click Away—DTC Genetics for Ancestry, Health, Love. . .and More: A View of the
Business and Regulatory Landscape, 8 APPL. & TRANSL. GENOM. 16, 16–9 (2016).
89 Id.
90 ROSANNAHERTZ&MARGARETK.NELSON, RANDOMFAMILIES: GENETIC STRANGERS, SPERMDONOR SIBLINGS,
AND THE CREATION OF NEW KIN (2019).
91 Woman Uses DNA Test, Finds Sperm Donor – and Pays a ‘Devastating’ Price (CBS News 31 Jan. 2019),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/woman-finds-sperm-donor-after-using-dna-test-raising-questions-about-
donor-anonymity/ (accessed Mar. 11, 2019) (woman sued by the sperm bank for breach of contract by
accidentally identifying the donor).
92 Press Release, FDA Permits Marketing of First Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Carrier Test for Bloom Syndrome
(FDA, Feb. 19, 2015), https://wayback.archive-it.org/7993/20170111191740/http://www.fda.gov/News
Events/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm435003.htm (accessed Apr. 15, 2019).
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conditions in 2017, including Parkinson’s disease and late-onset Alzheimer’s disease,93
followed by a GHR report for selected variants of BRCA1/BRCA2 in 2018.94 Under
this new regulatory approach, the FDA ‘intends to exempt additional 23andMe GHR
tests from the FDA’s premarket review, and GHR tests from other makers may be ex-
empt after submitting their first premarket notification [. . . ] allow[ing] other, similar
tests to enter the market as quickly as possible and in the least burdensome way, af-
ter a one-time FDA review’.95 Most recently, in October of 2018, the FDA authorized
23andMe tomarket a Pharmacogenetic (PGx)Reports test that detects 33 genetic vari-
ants associated with medication metabolism (eg response to certain antidepressants
and cardiac medications), imposing a warning label requirement designed to inform
consumers that they should not make any changes to their medications based on the
results.96
A 2017 study of 90 DTC-GT companies operating within the USA sheds light on
the information that these companies provide to consumers about their genetic data
practices.97 Although industry leaders generally had fairly comprehensive policies, al-
most 40%of the companies surveyed (35 of 90) provided no information to consumers
about their genetic data practices, including the fate of biological samples or the result-
ing genetic data. Of the 55 companies with policies governing genetic data, just over
half stated what information would be shared with the testing laboratory or what pro-
cedures, if any,were used to safeguard the information.Only half discussedwhether the
sample would be stored or not, a number of which had a policy of retaining the physical
sample (eg a saliva sample, cheek swab, or the extractedDNA). In addition, many indi-
cated that theywould retain any genetic data generated from these samples indefinitely.
While most policies made vague guarantees or assurances about data security, very few
provided specific details, and almost none stated that they would notify customers in
the event of a breach.
Policies also varied in terms of what information was provided regarding ownership
and commercialization of genetic data. Many companies did not explicitly claim own-
ership of a consumer’s DNA, but they often retained broad rights to commercialize the
resulting data. Of the 55 companies with policies governing genetic data, nearly half
(23 companies) had policies with provisions that indicated data would (or might) be
sharedwith third parties, yet none provided an exhaustive list. Eighteen explicitly stated
that they would share deidentified data with third parties without further consent. Ten
companies allowed participants to opt-in for sharing data with outside researchers,
93 Press Release, FDA Allows Marketing of First Direct-to-Consumer Tests that Provide Genetic Risk In-
formation for Certain Conditions (FDA, Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/
pressannouncements/ucm551185.htm (accessed Apr. 15, 2019).
94 Press Release, FDA Authorizes, with Special Controls, Direct-to-Consumer Test that Reports Three Mutations
in the BRCA Breast Cancer Genes (FDA, Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/
PressAnnouncements/ucm599560.htm (accessed Apr. 15, 2019).
95 Press Release, Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on Implementation of Agency’s Stream-
lined Development and Review Pathway for Consumer Tests that Evaluate Genetic Health Risks (FDA,
Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm583885.htm (ac-
cessed Apr. 15, 2019).
96 Press Release, FDA Authorizes First Direct-to-Consumer Test for Detecting Genetic Variants that May Be
AssociatedwithMedicationMetabolism (FDA,Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom
/PressAnnouncements/ucm624753.htm (accessed Apr. 15, 2019).
97 Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 88, at 48–57.
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while five explicitly permitted such sharing by default. The majority of the 38 compa-
nies that addressed sharing datawith the government or law enforcement said only that
they would do so ‘as required by law’ (eg in response to a subpoena, court order, reg-
ulation, or statute), but they provided little or no information about how they would
handle such a request. In addition,many policies contained broad ‘catch-all’ provisions
that provided for disclosure to third parties beyond law enforcement under a variety of
circumstances.98
The shortcomings of these policies in defining what data will be retained and with
whom they might be shared are particularly worrisome because these companies typi-
cally are not subject tomany of the laws that apply in clinical settings, such asHIPAA99
and Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA).100 As discussed above,
the FDA has asserted authority to regulate only companies like 23andMe that provide
certain health-related tests.The rest of the industry is largely left to self-regulate, includ-
ing with respect to the quantity and quality of information they provide to consumers
about their company’s genetic data practices.
State laws may also implicate the DTC industry, but they vary widely by jurisdic-
tion and in their scope. States regulate through a variety of mechanisms, some of which
are specific to genetic testing and the resulting data, including laboratory licensing re-
quirements, defining what constitutes the practice of medicine and who is authorized
to order certain genetic tests, or imposing informed consent requirements.101 A small
subset of states also grant individuals a property interest in their genetic information.102
Other laws are directed at the e-commerce industry more broadly but may also impli-
cate DTC services. 103 While state law may provide consumers with potential causes
of action against DTC companies in certain circumstances,104 these efforts are compli-
cated by the fact that consumers typically agree to terms and conditions that contain
exclusion clauses that limit a company’s liability or provisions that limit the remedies
and damages available to the consumer.105
98 See id. (discussing ‘catch-all’ provisions that appear to permit sharing with third parties other than law en-
forcement in many circumstances, including to protect the rights of the company, other users, or the public,
or to enforce the company’s terms and conditions).
99 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936.
100 Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-578, 102 Stat. 2903 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 263a (2018)).
101 HelenC.Dick,Risk andResponsibility: State Regulation andEnforcement of theDirect-to-ConsumerGenetic Test-
ing Industry, 6 ST. LOUIS U.J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 167, 174–184 (2012).
102 See Jessica L. Roberts, Progressive Genetic Ownership, 93 NOTREDAME L. REV. 1105, 1128 (2018) (discussing
five states that recognize such a property interest: Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana).
103 The most notable example is California’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003 (CalOPPA), a law that re-
quires commercial websites that collect personal information from California consumers to post a privacy
policy detailing what information is being collected and with what third parties it is being shared. See Cal.
Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 22575-22579 (2004).
104 Cole v. Gene by Gene, Ltd., No. 1:14-cv-00004, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101761 at ∗7, 9 (D. Alaska June 30,
2017) (denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the ground that Cole was able to demonstrate the req-
uisite injury-in-fact under Alaska’s Genetic Privacy Act, which ‘recognizes an exclusive property interest in
one’s DNA, and prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of DNA information’); Cole v. Gene by Gene, Ltd.,
No. 17-35837 at ∗2 (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 2018) (affirming the trial court’s denial of class certification for 900
Gene by Gene, Ltd. customers because ‘Cole failed to show that ‘common questions . . . predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members’ of his proposed class and subclass’). See also Roberts, supra
note 102, at 1110 (describing the factual background underlying the Cole case).
105 Andelka M. Phillips, Reading the Fine Print When Buying Your Genetic Self Online: Direct-to-Consumer Genetic
Testing Terms and Conditions, 36 NEWGENETICS & SOC’Y 273, 282 (2017).
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Arelatively lowbaseline of protection is providedby theFederalTradeCommission
(FTC),whichhas broad authority to police ‘unfair’ or ‘deceptive’ business practices un-
der the century-old Federal TradeCommissionAct.106 Despite this authority, the FTC
has rarely taken action against DTC genetic testing companies. The only meaningful
enforcement action to date occurred in 2014, against GeneLink, Inc., on the grounds
that its health-related claims of benefit were not supported by the evidence and that its
data security practices deviated from its privacy policy in such a way as to rise to the
level of unfair and deceptive.107 It is troubling that this is the only enforcement action,
because many DTC genetic companies fail to provide adequate information regarding
how genetic information will be collected and retained, how it will be used by the com-
pany, or with whom it will be shared, practices that would appear to be at odds with
the FTC’s articulation of the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs)108 and the
agency’s Proposed Privacy Framework.109
In the absence of a robust regulatory framework or binding guidelines governing ge-
netic data practices, the DTC genetic testing industry is left to develop its own volun-
tary best practices. In 2018, the Future of Privacy Forum released ‘Privacy Best Prac-
tices for Consumer Genetic Testing Services’, a document produced in coordination
with leadingDTC genetic testing companies (23andMe, Ancestry, Helix,MyHeritage,
andHabit) and consumer and privacy advocates.110TheBest Practices, which incorpo-
rate feedback from the FTC and draw heavily on the FIPPs, consist of eight principles
designed ‘to address the privacy issues related to the collection, retention, use, shar-
ing, and research based on Genetic Data’: (1) transparency; (2) consent; (3) use and
onward transfer; (4) access, integrity, retention, and deletion; (5) accountability; (6)
security; (7) privacy by design; and (8) consumer education.111 It is worth noting that
106 FederalTradeCommissionAct of 1914,Ch. 311, §5, 38 Stat. 719 (codified as amended at 15U.S.C. §§41–58
(2018)).
107 Complaint at 10–11, In re GeneLink, Inc. & Foru Int’l Corp., No. 112-3095 (F.T.C. Jan. 7, 2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140512genelinkcmpt.pdf (accessed Apr. 15, 2019).
108 Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace, U.S. FED. TRADE COMMISSION
(May 2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-fair-information-
practices-electronic-marketplace-federal-trade-commission-report/privacy2000.pdf (describing ‘the four
widely-accepted fair information practices’ of Notice, Choice, Access and Security). See also Robert
Gellman, Fair Information Practices: A Basic History (Apr. 10, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
https://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPshistory.pdf (accessed Apr. 15, 2019) (describing the various artic-
ulations of the fair information practices by various government agencies, including the FTC).
109 Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change, U.S. FED. TRADE COMMISSION (May 2012),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-
consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf (accessed Apr. 15, 2019)
(urging companies operating online to adopt the principles of ‘Privacy by Design’, ‘Simplified Consumer
Choice’, and ‘Transparency’).
110 Press Release, Future of Privacy Forum and Leading Genetic Testing Companies Announce Best Practices to Pro-
tect Privacy of ConsumerGeneticData (Future of Privacy Forum, July 31, 2018), https://fpf.org/2018/07/31/
future-of-privacy-forum-and-leading-genetic-testing-companies-announce-best-practices-to-protect-privacy
-of-consumer-genetic-data/ (accessed Apr. 15, 2019).
111 Privacy Best Practices for Consumer Genetic Testing Services, FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM (July 31, 2018),
https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Privacy-Best-Practices-for-Consumer-Genetic-Testing-
Services-FINAL.pdf (accessed Apr. 15, 2019). Key recommendations found in the Best Practices document
include (1) ‘Detailed transparency about howGenetic Data is collected, used, shared, and retained including
a high-level summary of key privacy protections posted publicly and made easily accessible to consumers’;
(2) ‘Separate express consent for transfer of Genetic Data to third parties and for incompatible secondary
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these guidelines do not place restrictions on genetic data that have been deidentified
if ‘the deidentification measures taken establish strong assurance that the data is not
identifiable’.112
Although adoption of the Best Practices is voluntary, and thus lack an enforcement
mechanism, companies are encouraged to ‘[p]rovide public/consumer facing com-
mitments that are enforceable by the FTC, State Attorneys General, or other authori-
ties’.113 The industry efforts embodied in the Best Practices represent a positive devel-
opment and help to facilitate a dialogue about important privacy issues, but it remains
to be seen whether they will be widely adopted across the diverse DTC-GT industry.
It is also unclear whether companies will be willing to make disclosures not currently
mandated under existing laws and regulations, especially disclosures that could expose
a company to potential liability.114
V. OTHER USES AND DISCLOSURES OF GENETIC INFORMATION
For individuals to maximize the healthcare benefits of their genetic data generated by
research (eg All of Us), DTC genetic tests, and other sources, the information needs
to be submitted and entered into the individual’s health record. Once in an electronic
health record (HER), however, it is subject to various nonconsensual disclosures per-
mitted by theHIPAAPrivacy Rule as well as numerous other disclosures compelled by
entities with the legal and/or economic leverage over the individual to require the in-
dividual to execute a HIPAA-compliant authorization. According to a recent estimate,
each year in the USA there are at least 25million compelled disclosures of health infor-
mation for various purposes, such as applications for employment and life insurance.115
Many of these authorizations are not limited in scope or otherwise do not prohibit re-
disclosure of the information to other entities.
V.A. HIPAAPublic Purpose Exceptions
The HIPAA Privacy Rule contains 12 ‘public purpose’ exceptions, which permit cov-
ered entities to disclose PHI, including genetic information, without the authorization
or consent of the individual.Theseprovisionspermit the followinguses anddisclosures:
(1) required by law;116 (2) for public health activities;117 (3) about victims of abuse,
uses’; (3) ‘Educational resources about the basics, risks, benefits, and limitations of genetic and personal
genomic testing’; (4) ‘Access, correction, and deletion rights’; (5) ‘Valid legal process for the disclosure
of Genetic Data to law enforcement and transparency reporting on at least an annual basis’; (6) ‘Ban on
sharing Genetic Data with third parties (such as employers, insurance companies, educational institutions,
and government agencies) without consent or as required by law’; (7) ‘Restrictions on marketing based on
Genetic Data’; and (8) ‘Strong data security protections and privacy by design, among others’. Press Release,
supra note 110.
112 FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM, supra note 111, at 3 (noting, however, ‘that currently, Genetic Data held at
the individual-level that has been deidentified cannot be represented as strongly protecting individuals from
reidentification, basedupon existing deidentification tools and standards. Suchdatamaybeprotected in other
ways and used for research with appropriate consent and security controls’).
113 Id. at 9.
114 See, eg Complaint at 12–13, In reGeneLink, supra note 107.
115 Mark A. Rothstein &Meghan K. Talbott, Compelled Disclosures of Health Records: Updated Estimates, 45 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 149 (2017).
116 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a) (2018).
117 Id. § 164.512(b).
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neglect, or domestic violence;118 (4) for health oversight activities;119 (5) for judi-
cial and administrative proceedings;120 (6) for law enforcement;121 (7) about dece-
dents;122 (8) for cadaveric organ, eye, or tissue donation;123 (9) for some types of
research;124 (10) to avert a serious threat to health or safety;125 (11) for specialized
government functions, including national security;126 and (12) for workers’ compen-
sation.127 The Privacy Rule does not require any disclosures under this provision. Any
requirement for covered entities to disclose information, such as to notify public health
agencies about certain infectious diseases, arise under separate provisions of federal or
state law. The public-purpose exceptions to the Privacy Rule establish that disclosure
of PHI for such a purpose is ‘permissive’ in the sense that covered entities may make
such disclosures without violating the Privacy Rule.
V.B. Other Lawful Uses of Genetic Information
Beyond the HIPAA public purpose exceptions, there are numerous instances in which
genetic informationmay be of great interest to other individuals or entities beyond the
healthcare setting. Arguably, the greatest threat to informational health privacy is the
fact that disclosure of health information (often including genetic information) may
be required as a lawful condition of a transaction or an application for benefits and that
the information is no longer protected under federal law once disclosed to an entity not
covered under the Privacy Rule.128 Generally, the twomain concerns in compelled dis-
closures are the scope of the information disclosed andwhether the use of the informa-
tion can result in discrimination.129The following commonuses of genetic information
generally involve instances in which consent or authorization is not legally required or
may be compelled by a third party seeking the information.
V.B.1. Criminal Justice and Forensics
Various federal and state statutory provisions apply to the use of genetic information
in criminal justice. The Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), the federal system
for the collection, analysis, storage, and use of DNA samples for forensic purposes,
was established by the DNA Identification Act of 1994.130 Through a tiered system
of databases, ‘CODIS enables federal, state, and local crime laboratories to exchange
and compare DNA profiles electronically, thereby linking crimes to each other’ and to
118 Id. § 164.512(c).
119 Id. § 164.512 (d).
120 Id. § 164.512 (e).
121 Id. § 164.512 (f).
122 Id. § 164.512 (g).
123 Id. § 164.512 (h).
124 Id. § 164.512 (i).
125 Id. § 164.512 (j).
126 Id. § 164.512 (k).
127 Id. § 164.512 (l).
128 See Rothstein & Talbott, supra note 115.
129 See Rothstein & Anderlik, supra note 40, at 152.
130 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2018). See Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, FBI,
http://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis.codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (accessedMar.
5, 2018).
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individuals whose DNA profiles are in CODIS.131 The success of DNA forensic identi-
fication programs has led to calls for expanded collection and searching, such as pro-
posals for population-wide databases132 and the use of partial matches (or ‘familial
searches’).133 Besides forensic identification, behavioral genetic information might be
used at other stages of the criminal justice system, such as at a bail hearing as evidence of
flight risk, at a trial on the issue of criminal capacity, and at parole hearings on the issue
of the likelihood of recidivism.134 The introduction of unvalidated behavioral genetic
theories, however, risks encouraging behavioral genetic reductionism and determin-
ism. Also of importance to genetic privacy, the HIPAA Privacy Rule provision permit-
ting covered entities to disclose PHI for law enforcement does not require a warrant,
subpoena, or any other legal process prior to disclosure.135
V.B.2. Education
Federal privacy protection extends to health information, including genetic informa-
tion, collected, stored, or used by educational institutions under the Federal Educa-
tional Rights and Privacy Act.136 Other laws applicable to the use of genetic informa-
tion in education include the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,137 Title II of
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),138 and section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act.139 Although little predictive genetic information is currently used in educational
settings, in the future student genetic information might be used (or misused) in ad-
missions, educational placement, curriculum development, and discipline.140
V.B.3. Employment
Title II of GINA prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of genetic in-
formation.141 The law, applicable to employers with 15 or more employees, attempts
to prevent discrimination by restricting access to or use of genetic information about
applicants, employees, and their family members.142 GINA must be read in con-
junction with Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which prohibits
131 Mark A. Rothstein &Meghan K. Talbott,The Expanding Use of DNA in Law Enforcement: What Role for Pri-
vacy?, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 153, 154 (2006).
132 See, eg J.W. Hazel et al., Is it Time for a Universal Genetic Forensic Database?, 362 SCIENCE 898 (2018); David
H. Kaye &Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases: Legality, Legitimacy, and the Case for Population-
Wide Coverage, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 413, 415 (2003); Arnold H. Loewy, A Proposal for the Universal Collection
of DNA, 48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 261, 262 (2015).
133 See, eg Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties:The Use of DNAOffender Databases to Catch Offenders’ Kin, 34 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 248, 253–4 (2006); David H. Kaye,Trawling DNADatabases for Partial Matches: What Is the
FBI Afraid of?, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 145, 166 (2009).
134 SeeMark A. Rothstein,Applications of Behavioural Genetics: Outpacing the Science?, 6NATUREREVS.GENETICS
793, 794–5 (2005).
135 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f) (2018).
136 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2018).
137 Id. §§ 1400–1482.
138 Id. §§ 12101-12213.
139 Id. § 706(8)(B).
140 See Laura F. Rothstein,Genetic Information in Schools, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CON-
FIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 317–331 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997).
141 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff (2018).
142 See Robert C. Green et al.,GINA, Genetic Discrimination, and Genomic Medicine, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 397,
397 (2015); Jessica L. Roberts, Rethinking Employment Discrimination Harms, 91 IND. L.J. 393, 401 (2016);
Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 63
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discrimination in employment on the basis of disability. Section 102(d)(3) of the ADA
provides that after a conditional offer of employment an employer may require a con-
ditional offeree to submit to an ‘employment entrance examination’, which may be of
unlimited scope, and also to execute a HIPAA-compliant authorization for the release
of all of the individual’s health records.143 AfterGINA, this provision onmedical exami-
nations and disclosures applies to all health information except genetic information.144
The problem is that it is difficult to segregate genetic information in medical records,
especially because the definition of genetic information inGINA includes family health
histories.Therefore, it is common for healthcare providers to disclose complete health
records, which often includes genetic information.
Another problemwithGINA is that it applies only to individuals whose genetic con-
dition has not ‘manifested’ and therefore are asymptomatic. On the other hand, the
ADA provides a remedy for individuals who have been subject to discrimination based
on expressed genetic conditions that cause a substantial limitation of a major life ac-
tivity. Again, reading GINA and the ADA together, individuals who have a manifested
genetic condition that does not constitute a substantial limitation of a major life activ-
ity are not protected by either law.145 In addition to federal laws, 35 states have enacted
laws prohibiting genetic discrimination in employment.146
V.B.4. Family Law
State laws traditionally regulate virtually all aspects of family law, including adoption,
child custody, and paternity determinations. DNA forensic tests have revolutionized
the proof of paternity,147 although some uses of the technology are not necessarily
beneficial to children, such as disestablishment lawsuits brought by nonmarital fathers
seeking to end their support obligations.148 TheUniform Parentage Act, most recently
revised in 2017 by the Uniform Law Commission, attempts to regularize the rules for
acknowledgments, denials, notifications to presumed fathers, and other issues.149
VAND.L.REV. 439, 443(2010);MarkA.Rothstein, JessicaL.Roberts,&TeeL.Guidotti,LimitingOccupational
Medical Examinations under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act, 41 AM. J.L. &MED. 523, 550–1 (2015).
143 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4) (2018); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(3) (2018).
144 See Rothstein, Roberts & Guidotti, supra note 142.
145 SeeMarkA. Rothstein,GINA, the ADA, andGenetic Discrimination in Employment, 36 J.L.MED.&ETHICS 837,
839 (2008). With regard to [their] coverage, GINA and the ADA are mirror images, with GINA covering
asymptomatic individuals and the ADA covering those with conditions that have manifested.The problem is
that there is a large gapbetween these statutes, and some individualsmaynot be coveredunder either law.This
would include individuals who have a biomarker of genome-environment interaction, a subclinical marker
of aberrant gene expression, or an initial symptom of a gene-associated disease. New medical technologies,
laboratory tests, and sophisticated imaging that measure incipient or occult disease based on gene-mediated
processes could increase this gap.
Mark A. Rothstein, GINA at Ten and the Future of Genetic Nondiscrimination Law, 48 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 5,
6 (2018).
146 NHGRI, supra note 72.
147 See GENETIC TIES AND THE FAMILY: THE IMPACT OF PATERNITY TESTING ON PARENTS AND CHILDREN (Mark
A. Rothstein et al. eds., 2005).
148 See, eg Atcherian v. State, 14 P.3d 970, 973 (Alaska 2000) (holding that man was entitled to a refund only of
child support paid after date he filed motion to vacate default judgment of paternity on basis of genetic test
results); In re Parentage of C.S., 139 P.3d 366, 368 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that husband was not
permitted to disestablish himself as presumed parent and to establish paternity of another man).
149 Uniform Parentage Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Committee.aspx?title=
Parentage%20Act%20(2017) (accessedMar. 12, 2018).
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V.B.5. Government Benefits
The availability of several types of government benefits depends on the proof of the
cause of a claimant’s injury or disability. Genetic information, along with othermedical
information, may be used to establish the etiology of a health condition. For example,
genetic informationmay help to prove or disprove the service-relatedness of a claim for
veterans’ benefits or the work-relatedness of a workers’ compensation claim.150
V.B.6. Immigration
Family reunification has been an important principle of international immigration law
since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.151 Several developed coun-
tries have used DNA testing to establish genetic relatedness,152 although some immi-
grant organizations claim that such testing is expensive and has been used to discourage
immigration from ‘undesirable’ countries.153 Requiring genetic connections also disad-
vantages those whose family relationships are based on adoption or alternative repro-
ductive technologies as well as more informal kinship/care giving relationships. It is
unclear whether DNA testing will have an increasingly important role in the USA as a
way to verify the relatedness of immigrants and asylum seekers.
V.B.7. Insurance
Genetic discrimination in insurance, especially health insurance, was one of the first
public concerns raised by the Human Genome Project.154 By the end of the 1990s,
48 states had enacted laws prohibiting genetic discrimination in health insurance.155
GINA, enacted in 2008, added federal protection, but like the state laws, it only pro-
hibits discrimination against asymptomatic individuals.TheAffordable Care Act,156 by
prohibiting all health-based discrimination in individual and group health insurance,
providesmore comprehensive nondiscrimination protection. Some states also regulate
150 InEEOCv.BurlingtonN. Santa FeR.R.Co.,No.C01-4013 (N.D. Iowa, filedFeb. 9, 2001), theEEOCsought
a preliminary injunction against the railroad to end the required genetic testing of employees who filed claims
for work-related injuries based on carpal tunnel syndrome. The EEOC alleged that the employees were un-
aware that required blood samples were used for a genetic test for a chromosome 17 deletion associated with
hereditarypressurepalsyneuropathy, a rare condition thatmaypredict some formsof carpal tunnel syndrome.
The action was based on section 102(d)(4) of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4),
which provides that any medical examinations or inquiries of current employees must be either voluntary or
job-related.The EEOC’s position was that the unproven genetic test was not job-related.The case was subse-
quently settled, with the company discontinuing its practice of genetic testing.
151 Declaration of Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr
(accessedMar. 13, 2018).
152 See Palmira Granados Moreno & Yann Joly, DNA Testing for Immigration and Family Reunification?, J.L.
&BIOSCI., http://blog.oup.com/2017/08/dna-testing-immigration-family-reunification/ (accessed Apr. 15,
2019) (2017) (noting that at least 21 countries, including Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, UK,
and USA, use DNA testing in family reunification cases). See also J. Taitz et al.,The Last Resort: Exploring
the Use of DNA Testing for Family Reunification, 6 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 20, 24 (2002); Torsten Heinemann
&Thomas Lemke, Biological Citizenship Reconsidered: The Use of DNA Analysis by Immigration Authorities in
Germany, 39 SCI. TECH. &HUM. VALUES 488, 496 (2014).
153 LORIANDREWS&DOROTHYNELKIN, BODYBAZAAR:THEMARKETFORHUMANTISSUE INTHEBIOTECHNOLOGY
AGE 115-16 (2001).
154 NIH-DOEWORKINGGROUP ON ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OFHUMANGENOME RESEARCH,
GENETIC INFORMATION ANDHEALTH INSURANCE (1993).
155 All states except Mississippi and Pennsylvania have enacted such a law. See NHGRI, supra note 72.
156 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001-18122 (2018).
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jlb/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jlb/lsz007/5489401 by Vanderbilt U
niversity Library user on 01 O
ctober 2019
The law of genetic privacy  25
the use of genetic information in other insurance products,157 including life,158 disabil-
ity,159 and long-term care insurance,160 but none of them prohibits the underwriting
use of an individual’s genetic information contained in his or her health records.161
Regulating the use of genetic information in insurance is extremely difficult for sev-
eral reasons. First, the social function of insurance varies greatly among the various
types of insurance products. Second, the insurance industry is large, politically pow-
erful, and, in the case of life insurance, has been doing business largely the sameway for
centuries. It is loath to make fundamental changes in underwriting practices, includ-
ing unlimited access to applicants’ health information, which the industry believes is
necessary to prevent adverse selection.Third, there is a close relationship between pri-
vate insurance and public programs for income replacement. For example, regulatory
changes in disability insurance underwriting would affect government expenditures for
Social SecurityDisability Insurance and regulatory changes in long-termcare insurance
underwriting would affect government expenditures for Medicaid payments for nurs-
ing home care. If insurers could deny coverage to genetically at-risk individuals, the
increased costs for these individuals would be borne by taxpayers rather than other in-
surance policyholders.
V.B.8. Occupational and Environmental Health
Individuals vary widely in their susceptibility and response to occupational and envi-
ronmental toxins, and toxicogenomics has helped to explain the genetic basis of many
of these differences.162 The use of genetic and genomic information in occupational
and environmental risk assessment raises numerous issues, including setting the most
appropriate exposure limits, establishing the duties owed to sensitive individuals, defin-
ing the relationship between regulatory and nondiscrimination statutes, and balanc-
ing the roles of autonomy and paternalism in deciding whether individuals should be
able to accept increased risks.163 GINA prohibits the use of genetic information in em-
ployment decisions,164 but genetic information is likely to play an increased role in
157 NHGRI, supra note 72.
158 See GENETICS AND LIFE INSURANCE: MEDICAL UNDERWRITING AND PUBLIC POLICY (Mark A. Rothstein ed.,
2004); Anya E. R. Prince, Insurance Risk Classification in an Era of Genomics: Is a Rational Discrimination Policy
Rational?, 96 NEB. L. REV. 624, 644–5 (2018); Mark A. Rothstein, Time to End the Use of Genetic Test Results
in Life Insurance Underwriting, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 794, 797 (2018).
159 See Susan M. Wolf & Jeffrey P. Kahn, Genetic Testing and the Future of Disability Insurance: Ethics, Law &
Policy, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 6, 7 (2007) (Supp. 2).
160 See Mark A. Rothstein, Predictive Genetic Testing for Alzheimer’s Disease in Long-Term Care Insurance, 35 GA.
L. REV. 707, 725 (2001); Donald H. Taylor, Jr. et al., Genetic Testing for Alzheimer’s and Long-Term Care
Insurance, 29 HEALTH AFF. 102, 105 (2010); Cathleen Zick et al., Genetic Testing for Alzheimer’s Disease and
Its Impact on Insurance Purchasing Behavior, 24 HEALTH AFF. 483, 484 (2005).
161 For example, Vermont prohibits insurance companies from requiring genetic testing as a condition of apply-
ing for any type of insurance as well as using the results of genetic tests of family members in underwriting.
Insurers may still use the results of an applicant’s genetic tests performed in the clinical setting and docu-
mented in his or her medical record. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9334(a).
162 See NATIONAL RESEARCHCOUNCIL, APPLICATIONS OF TOXICOGENOMIC TECHNOLOGIES TO PREDICTIVE TOXI-
COLOGY AND RISK ASSESSMENT (2007).
163 See GENOMICS AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND LAW (Richard R. Sharp et al. eds.,
2008); AndrewGendron&ThomasMorgan,Whole Exome Sequencing and Federal Courts, FOR THEDEFENSE,
Jan. 2019, at 22.
164 Section 202(b)(5) of GINA permits an employer to conduct genetic monitoring of the biological effects of
toxic substances in theworkplace, but only if the employer (A) provides written notice of themonitoring; (B)
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regulating exposures covered by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
and the Environmental Protection Agency.
V.B.9. Personal Injury Litigation
Genetic information can play an important part in personal injury litigation. Besides
medicalmalpractice cases, genetic informationmight be relied upon by either plaintiffs
or defendants in attempting to prove or disprove causation in toxic tort and other cases
involving allegedly harmful exposures.165 In any personal injury case in which a court
is asked to base prospective damages on the life expectancy of the plaintiff, the defen-
dant may seek to compel genetic testing of the plaintiff or to admit predictive genetic
information into evidence.166 In such an event, already-injured plaintiffsmay be forced
to learn genetic information that they would prefer not to know.
V.B.10. Real Property and Commercial Transactions
Genetic discrimination claims involving real property and commercial transactions are
likely to grow in importance. For example, senior residential communities, mortgage
companies, or other entities might seek to prevent individuals with a genetic predispo-
sition to Alzheimer’s disease from purchasing, renting, or obtaining financing for real
property.167 A retirement facilitymight be concerned that individuals with Alzheimer’s
diseasewouldundermine thedevelopment’smarketing strategyof appealing to vibrant,
active, and healthy retirees. It is not clear whether the federal Fair Housing Act,168 as
amended, which prohibits discrimination based on disability, would apply to genetic
discrimination. California is the only state that specifically prohibits the use of genetic
information to discriminate in housing.169
VI. GENETICS AND IDENTIFICATION
Genetic data are in identifiable form in a patient’s EHR. The privacy issues, then, are
who can get access to these records as well as what can be done with the data once they
the employee provides prior, knowing, voluntary, and written authorization or the monitoring is required by
federal or state law; (C) the employee is informed of individual monitoring results; (D) themonitoring com-
plies with any federal or state regulations dealing with genetic monitoring; and (E) the employer, excluding
any licensed healthcare professional or certified genetic counselor, receives the results only in aggregate form
and does not disclose the identity of specific employees.This exception applies only to themonitoring of cur-
rent employees and does not permit the testing of applicants or conditional offerees for genetic susceptibility
to workplace exposures. For a pre-GINA proposal recommending voluntary genetic testing and monitoring
before and after the commencement of employment, see Mark A. Rothstein, Genetics and the Work Force of
the Next Hundred Years, 3 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 371, 393–5 (2000).
165 See Jamie A. Grodsky, Genomics and Toxic Torts: Dismantling the Risk-Injury Divide, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1671,
1693 (2007); Gary E. Marchant, Genetic Data in Toxic Tort Litigation, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 7, 9–10 (2006). See
also GARY E.MARCHANT ET AL., FROMGENETICS TOGENOMICS: FACING THE LIABILITY IMPLICATIONS (2019).
166 SeeDianeE.Hoffmann&KarenH.Rothenberg, JudgingGenes: Implications of the SecondGeneration ofGenetic
Tests in the Courtroom, 66MD.L.REV. 858, 865 (2007); Anthony S.Niedwiecki, Science Fact or Science Fiction?
The Implications of Court-Ordered Genetic Testing Under Rule 35, 34 U. S. FLA. L. REV. 295, 296 (2000); Mark
A. Rothstein, Preventing the Discovery of Plaintiff Genetic Profiles by Defendants Seeking to Limit Damages in
Personal Injury Litigation, 71 IND. L.J. 877, 881–2 (1996).
167 See Mark A. Rothstein & Laura Rothstein, How Genetics Might Affect Real Property Rights, 44 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 216, 217 (2016).
168 FairHousingAmendmentsAct of 1988, Pub. L.No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 619 (codified as amended at 42U.S.C.
§§ 3601–3631 (2018)).
169 CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12920–12922, 12955 (West 2018).
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have been obtained. Access to information in themedical record is controlled primarily
byHIPAA, which as noted above has numerous exceptions, as well as state law in some
jurisdictions. Data collected or used in National Institutes of Health (NIH)-funded
research has additional protections. To comply with the 21st Century Cures Act,170
the NIH now automatically issues Certificates of Confidentiality, which prevents com-
pelled disclosure to most third parties, to all NIH-funded research involving ‘identifi-
able, sensitive information’, specifically defined by NIH as including ‘[r]esearch that
involves the generation of individual level, human genomic data from biospecimens, or
the use of such data’.171 Use of genetic data is also subject to anti-discrimination laws,
such as GINA, the ADA, and some state laws, as well as provisions of the ACA.
VI.A. TheDebate about Reidentification
Deidentification and reidentification of genetic specimens is a contentious issue. A
valuable starting point to the policy debate is asking how likely is it that people will
be harmed by being identified from genetic data from which identifiers have been re-
moved, which commonly occurs in research. Deidentification is often done to protect
the identity of research participants and their families.172 Researchers also may seek
to deidentify data to facilitate their investigations, eg, to avail themselves of the excep-
tion to the Common Rule ‘if the information is recorded by the investigator in such a
manner that subjects cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the
subjects’173 and to avoid the need to obtain authorization under the HIPAA Privacy
Rule.174 The practice of deidentifying data for research has a long history, particularly
in epidemiological studies, of which modern genomics is a part.
Although some have worried for years that genomic data are particularly identifi-
able because they are unique,175 there has been no tsunami of efforts to reidentify peo-
ple from their DNA or genomic data.176 This result was to be expected in the context
of research because research institutions have strong incentives to provide security for
data in order to avoid federal and state penalties as well as bad publicity. It is common
practice to require that investigators contractually agree not to attempt to reidentify
the individuals from whom data were derived, and some institutions audit researchers
to ensure that this does not occur.177
170 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 102 Stat. 1033 (2016).
171 Notice of Changes to NIH Policy for Issuing Certificates of Confidentiality, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH (2017),
https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-17-109.html (accessed Apr. 15, 2019).
172 Jeffrey R. Botkin et al., Privacy and Confidentiality in the Publication of Pedigrees: A Survey of Investigators and
Biomedical Journals, 279 JAMA 1808, 1812 (1998).
173 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) (2018).
174 Oscar Ferrandez et al., Evaluating Current Automatic De-identification Methods with Veteran’s Health Adminis-
tration Clinical Documents, 12 BMCMED. RES.METHODOLOGY 109 (2012), at 1, 2; SharonaHoffman&Andy
Podgurski, Balancing Privacy, Autonomy, and Scientific Needs in Electronic Health Records Research, 65 SMUL.
Rev. 85, 95 (2012).
175 Zhen Lin et al.,Genetics, Genomic Research andHuman Subject Privacy, 305 SCIENCE 183, 183 (2004); Bradley
Malin & Latanya Sweeney,How (Not) to Protect Genomic Data Privacy in a Distributed Network: Using Trail
Re-identification to Evaluate andDesign Anonymity Protection Systems, 37 J. BIOMEDICAL INFORMATICS 179, 191
(2004).
176 Gymrek et al., Identifying Personal Genomes by Surname Inference, 339 SCIENCE 321, 321 (2013).
177 Jill Pulley et al., Principles of Human Subjects Protections Applied in an Opt-out De-identified Biobank, 3 CLIN.
TRANSL. SCI. 42 (2010).
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Perhaps more important, identifying the source of an unknown sample of DNA or
genetic data typically requires that it bematched to an identified sample, either directly
or through familial tracing,178 ie, the identification of individuals who share DNA se-
quences with the targeted individual. Until recently, the main sources of identified ge-
netic data in theUSAwere forensic databases, which are accessible only to law enforce-
ment.These data rely on a limited number of noncoding, short tandem repeats (STRs),
a different DNA characteristic from those historically contained in research datasets,
whichoften focusonanalysing singlebasepair changes.179While STRresults are shared
among law enforcement in the CODIS system, identifying information is retained lo-
cally. Moreover, the limited number of markers in forensic databanks limits the power
of familial tracing to close relatives.
What has changed is the convergence of the dramatically decreased cost of sequenc-
ing and data storage, the increased ease of sharing data on the Internet, and the rise
of new business services that offer analysis and interpretation of DNA sequence data.
Millions of people have submitted samples for analysis toDTC companies.These com-
panies advertise a wide array of products, ranging from providing health information
to uncovering family relationships for genealogy or detecting misattributed parentage.
These companies vary in what analysis they perform, but many examine hundreds of
thousands of single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), or single base pair changes,
yielding a tremendous amountof data.Thesedata, becauseof their size,make it possible
to identify far more distant relatives than can be achieved using forensic databases.
Thus, the likelihood of being reidentified often turns on the extent to which these
commercial or public repositories control access to the data they hold.The largest com-
panies, 23andMeandAncestry.com, strive to protect the identity of their customers, for
instance, by asking customers whether they want to reveal their identity to a putative
relative.Moreover, these two companies have vigorously resisted requests for access by
law enforcement, efforts theymake public in their transparency reports.180 A recent ar-
ticle by Hazel and Slobogin, however, reveals that most sites, including the large num-
ber that engage in nonconsensual, surreptitious testing, have poor privacy policies at
best.181 Thus, these companies may be ready sources of identified genomic data.
Companies’ policies are not the only factor increasing the possibility of reidentifi-
cation, as millions of people have posted genomic data with identifiers on open access
websites. Some place these data on such sites as the Personal Genome Project182 or
OpenSNP.org.183 Interestingly, some of the latter’s depositors still believe their privacy
178 Victor W.Weedn &Howard J. Baum,DNA Identification in Mass Fatality Incidents, 32 AM. J. FORENSICMED.
PATHOLOGY 393, 393 (2011); Frederick R. Bieber et al.,Human Genetics. Finding Criminals through DNA of
Their Relatives, 312 SCIENCE 1315, 1315 (2006).
179 There may be more overlap between forensic and research data in the future. Jaehee Kim et al., Statistical
Detection of Relatives Typed with Disjoint Forensic and Biomedical Loci, 175 CELL 848 (2018).
180 Transparency Report, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/transparency-report/; https://www.ancestry.
com/cs/transparency (accessed Oct. 15, 2018).
181 Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 88, at 30–1.
182 Madeline P. Ball et al.,Harvard Personal Genome Project: Lessons from Participatory Public Research, GENOME
MED., 2014, at 1, 1; Madeline P. Ball et al., A Public Resource Facilitating Clinical Use of Genomes, 109 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S. 11920, 11920 (2012).
183 B. Greshake et al.,OpenSNP–A Crowdsourced Web Resource for Personal Genomics, PLOS ONE, 2014, at 1, 2,
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0089204 (accessed Apr. 15, 2019).
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is protected.184 The site hosting individually identified genetic data that have received
the most attention recently, however, is GEDMatch,185 a citizen-run site created to fa-
cilitate genealogy research in which over one million people have placed their identi-
fied raw SNP data fromDTC companies. Indeed, some investigators have opined that
‘a large percentage of people have at least one high-confidence genetic cousin in GED-
match’.186 Until recently, that site’s privacy policy read, in part:
While the results presented on this site are intended solely for genealogical research, we
are unable to guarantee that users will not find other uses. If you find the possibility unac-
ceptable, please remove your data from this site.187
Data from this site were used by law enforcement to identify the infamous Golden
State Killer, by identifying and then tracing a fourth cousin.188 Since that identifica-
tion, another forensics company reportedly has submitted samples from 100 cases to
GEDMatch and has identified 20 close matches. The founders of GEDMatch report
that more people support the use of data to identify potential criminals than object.189
Nonetheless, they have updated the site’s privacy policy, noting that data may be used
for familial searches to identify perpetrators. Interestingly, they state that law enforce-
ment is specifically permitted to upload ‘raw data’ to identify perpetrators of sexual as-
sault or homicide. They define this as a new limit on what the police can do, implicitly
rejecting access to solve other types of crimes. Their new policy requires that people
submitting data about third parties have permission or legal authority to do so,190 al-
though how this would be enforced is by no means clear.
In the future, it may be possible to infer enough about an individual’s facial fea-
tures from his or her DNA191 to permit the person to be identified, especially in light
of the growing sophistication of photograph tagging software. How well such predic-
tions work currently, however, has been questioned.192 Nonetheless, the Bavarian par-
liament recently enacted a controversial law permitting law enforcement to analyse
184 Tobias Haeusermann et al.,Open Sharing of Genomic Data: Who Does It andWhy?, PLOSONE, 2017, at 1, 2,
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0177158 (accessed Apr. 15, 2019).
185 Tools for DNA and Genealogy Research, GEDMATCH, www.gedmatch.com (accessed Nov. 2, 2018).
186 Doc Edge & Graham Coop, How Lucky Was the Genetic Investigation in the Golden State Killer
Case?, WORDPRESS: GCBIAS (May 7, 2018), https://gcbias.org/2018/05/07/how-lucky-was-the-genetic-
investigation-in-the-golden-state-killer-case/ (accessed Apr. 15, 2019).
187 Updates to the Terms of Service and Privacy Policy at GEDmatch, BLOGGER: CRUWYS NEWS (May
21, 2018), https://cruwys.blogspot.com/2018/05/updates-to-terms-of-service-and-privacy.html (accessed
Apr. 15, 2019).
188 Natalie Ram et al., Genealogy Databases and the Future of Criminal Investigation, 360 SCIENCE 1078, 1078
(2018).
189 Kristen V. Brown, Killer App? DNA Site Had Unwitting Role in Golden State Manhunt, BLOOMBERG (May
29, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-29/killer-app-dna-site-had-
unwitting-role-in-golden-state-manhunt (accessed Apr. 15, 2019).
190 BLOGGER: CRUWYS NEWS, supra note 187.
191 Christoph Lippert et al., Identification of Individuals by Trait Prediction UsingWhole-Genome Sequencing Data,
114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S. 10166, 10169 (2017).
192 Antonio Regalado, Does Your Genome Predict Your Face? Not Quite Yet, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 7, 2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608813/does-your-genome-predict-your-face-not-quite-yet/
(accessed Apr. 15, 2019).
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DNA to predict phenotypic characteristics such as eye color to assist in their investi-
gations.193
Additional risks that people can be identified from research, clinical information, or
biospecimens arise because most genomic research involves other data about partici-
pants, including their demographics,194 medical history, their activities, and their social
and built environment. These other data can be more easily identifiable in the current
data environment than are genomic data themselves.195
In light of all these developments, a critical question is how likely is it that someone
will try to reidentify the source of a deidentified sample. Recent investigations have sug-
gested that in many circumstances, it simply may not be worth the attacker’s while to
identify someone from his or her deidentified DNA, given the costs of attempting to
do so, especially if the biobank protects the data.196 Even less is known about the cir-
cumstances under which an attacker would seek to reidentify DNA in order to learn
about the individual’s genetic traits and predispositions, especially since that informa-
tionmightbemore easily available inotherways.Nonetheless, effortsmaybewarranted
to create incentives to decrease the probability of reidentification as well as to amelio-
rate any adverse consequences thatmight occurwere inappropriate identification tooc-
cur. Part of the solution to deter reidentification in the first placemay be to adopting the
proposal by the Working Group of the Precision Medicine Initiative197 that Congress
adopt penalties for inappropriately reidentifying or otherwise misusing data.
VI.B. SurreptitiousGenetic Testing
Surreptitious or nonconsensual genetic testing refers to the covert collection and anal-
ysis of an individual’s genetic material without their consent, generally carried out by
another individual, such as a family member or a current/former romantic partner, or
by law enforcement in the forensic context. Individuals may have a variety of motives
for surreptitious genetic testing, such as to covertly determine parentage, to uncover
whether a romantic partner is being unfaithful, or to discover sensitive medical infor-
mation such as disease or carrier status, perhaps about a potential partner. In the law
enforcement context, police use surreptitious forensic testing as an investigatory tool
to gather evidence against an individual suspected of a crime and to facilitate identifica-
tionof a suspect.198 Whether carried out by a private citizen or law enforcement, eachof
these developments raises their own set of unique ethical issues and privacy concerns.
193 Gretchen Vogel, In Germany, Controversial Law Gives Bavarian Police New Power to Use DNA, SCIENCE
(May 15, 2018, 5:20 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/05/germany-controversial-law-gives-
bavarian-police-new-power-use-dna (accessed Apr. 15, 2019).
194 Latanya Sweeney et al., Identifying Participants in the Personal Genome Project by Name (A Re-identification
Experiment), ARXIV (Apr. 29, 2013), https://arxiv.org/abs/1304.7605 (accessed Apr. 15, 2019).
195 Thismay be particularly concerning in the case where one party receives genomic data on a limited number of
individuals about whom the first party has other information that could be used to facilitate reidentification.
Leslie E.Wolf et al.,Certificates of Confidentiality: Protecting Human Subject Research Data in Law and Practice,
43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 594, 594 (2015).
196 Zhiyu Wan et al., Expanding Access to Large-Scale Genomic Data While Promoting Privacy: A Game Theoretic
Approach, 100 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 316, 317 (2017).
197 NIHPrecisionMedicine Initiative (PMI)WorkingGroupReport to theAdvisoryCommittee to theDirector,
ThePrecisionMedicine Initiative Cohort – Building aResearch Foundation for 21st CenturyMedicine, NIH (2015),
http://acd.od.nih.gov/reports/DRAFT-PMI-WG-Report-9-11-2015-508.pdf (accessed Apr. 15, 2019).
198 Rothstein & Talbott, supra note 131, at 156.
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The rise in surreptitious testing has been made possible by the increasing sensi-
tivity and availability (and decreasing cost) of genetic testing and analysis. Numer-
ous studies199 have documented the proliferation of companies offering these services
directly to consumers and, in some cases, law enforcement. A recent survey of 90DTC
companies operating in the USA revealed that nearly one-third appeared to offer some
form of surreptitious testing, generally alongside paternity and other family relation-
ship tests. Companies offer these services under a variety of different names (eg ‘foren-
sic’, ‘discreet’, ‘special sample’, and ‘infidelity’ testing) and permit, or even encourage,
consumers to submit covertly collected samples ranging from strands of hair, discarded
cigarettebutts, andused condoms to articles of clothing containing suspicious stains.200
However, companies rarely warn consumers of the potential legal consequences that
might arise from the surreptitious collection or analysis of another person’s genetic
material without their consent and often have privacy policies lacking even the basic
information about their practices regarding the collection, use, and sharing of genetic
data.201
The most obvious issue raised by surreptitious testing, generally in the context of
testing performed by private citizens, is the lack of consent. Knowledgeable agree-
ment to be tested is vital due to the potentially harmful consequences that could flow
from the unwanted disclosure of that information (eg disruption of family relation-
ships stemming from misattributed parentage, unwanted revelations regarding cul-
tural/racial identity, or discrimination based on disease or carrier status) as well as the
potential secondary uses of the genetic information once it enters the DTC ecosystem
(where it couldbeused for internal research andproduct developmentby the company,
or shared with third parties for research, commercial, or law enforcement purposes).
Given the likely motives for surreptitious testing and its connection to the paternity
and family relationship testing industry, the practice is likely to implicate the genetic
material of children/minors. A less obvious concern, present in both the civilian and
law enforcement contexts, relates to the underlying quality of the samples being anal-
ysed. Unlike testing performed on samples collected in more controlled settings, sur-
reptitious testing generally involves analysis of samples containing DNA of question-
able quality or in limited quantity, greatly increasing the possibility of erroneous results,
which might have serious consequences for the individual being tested.
Data on how frequently individuals engage in surreptitious testing are sparse, but
a recent survey of Canadian consumers of DTC services provides some insight into
the frequency with which individuals submit the genetic material of others for test-
ing.202 The study found that one-third of consumers who had purchased DTCs (60 of
180) reported that they had submitted the sample of another person for testing, with or
without consent, including their children or their partner’s children, current and past
199 See Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 88, at 48, 56–7; Emily Christofides & Kieran O’Doherty, Company
Disclosure and Consumer Perceptions of the Privacy Implications of Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing, 35
NEW GENETICS & SOC’Y 101, 107 (2016); Andelka M. Phillips, Only a Click Away—DTC Genetics for An-
cestry, Health, Love. . .and More: A View of the Business and Regulatory Landscape, 8 APPL. & TRANSL. GENOM.
16, 17, 22 (2016).
200 Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 88, at 14.
201 Id. at 14–5.
202 Christofides &O’Doherty, supra note 199, at 112–3.
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partners, suspected children or parents, or other family members.203 Over a third of
these individuals (38%; 23 of 60) reported that they had not obtained permission be-
fore submitting the person’s sample for testing and analysis.204 While the study’s au-
thors noted that the apparent lack of permission does not necessarily imply nefarious
intent or that the test was carried out in a truly surreptitious fashion (eg parents ob-
taining testing on behalf of their child or a willing family member), these figures raise
serious questions and concerns about the prevalence of this practice.
The frequency with which surreptitious testing appears to occur might not be sur-
prising in light of the paucity of relevant federal and state law on the subject and the
limited scope of the laws that do exist. Despite repeated calls from legal scholars205 and
government advisory committees206 for increased oversight of surreptitious testing and
stricter laws governing nonconsensual collection and analysis of the genetic material of
others, no comprehensive federal laws currently prohibit the practice. However, fed-
eral laws, such as theACA207 orGINA,208 may provide some limited protection against
the practice if it were to be undertaken to limit access to employment or health insur-
ance. In contrast, the UK recognizes ‘DNA theft’ as a crime, punishable by a mone-
tary fine and/or up to three years of imprisonment, which strictly prohibits individuals
from analysing the genetic material of others without their consent in many circum-
stances.209
Instead, the USA relies on a patchwork of state laws that place varying restrictions
on the practice depending on the purpose of the testing or the context inwhich it is per-
formed. A 50-state survey conducted by theGenetics and Public Policy Center in 2009
revealed that a total of 29 states had laws ‘restrict[ing] collectionofDNAsamples,DNA
analysis, [and/or] disclosure of test results without the consent of the person tested.’210
Surreptitious genetic testing performed for health-related purposes was themost com-
monly restricted activity (15 states), although a number of states placed restrictions
on nonconsensual testing for both health-related and non-health-related purposes
(10 states).211 A subset of states restricted surreptitious testing only when carried
out in a specific context, such as court-ordered parentage proceedings (six states) or
203 Id. at 113. Interestingly, no participant surveyed in this study reported using these services to discover infi-
delity.
204 Id.
205 See, eg Elizabeth Joh, DNA Theft: Recognizing the Crime of Nonconsensual Genetic Collection and Testing, 91
B.U.L. REV. 665, 668–9 (2011); Mark A. Rothstein,Genetic Stalking and Voyeurism: A New Challenge to Pri-
vacy, 57 KAN. L. REV. 539, 561–2 (2009); Nicole Strand, Shedding Privacy Along with Our Genetic Material:
What Constitutes Adequate Legal Protection Against Surreptitious Genetic Testing?, 18 AMA J. ETHICS 264, 274
(2016).
206 See, eg SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, & SOC’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER GENETIC TESTING (Apr. 2010), https://osp.od.nih.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2013/11/SACGHS DTC Report 2010.pdf (accessed Apr. 15, 2019) (identifying ‘the ex-
tent to which DTC services are being used for surreptitious genetic testing’ as an area warranting additional
scrutiny by the committee and federal agencies).
207 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001-18122 (2018).
208 Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 110–233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008).
209 U.K. Human Tissue Act of 2004.
210 State Laws Pertaining to Surreptitious DNA Testing, GENETICS & PUB. POL’Y CTR. (2009), https://web.
archive.org/web/20100827054416/http://www.dnapolicy.org/resources/State law summaries final all
states.pdf.
211 Id. at 1.
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employment (two states).212Thepossible penalties variedwidely by state, ranging from
exposure to civil liability in a private cause of action to criminal punishment in the form
of fines (generally ranging from $1000 to $10,000) and/or sentences of up to one year
in jail. Still unclear is the extent to which courts will be willing to recognize a property
interest in geneticmaterial sufficient to support causes of action for surreptitious testing
under common-law torts such as conversion or invasion of privacy.213
The result of this heterogeneity is that DTC companies are left to set their own poli-
cies governing surreptitious testing and the submission of another individual’s sam-
ple without their consent. According to the Best Practices recently developed (and
adopted) by industry leaders in conjunction with the Future of Privacy Forum, compa-
nies should require separate express consent from consumers that are submitting sam-
ples on behalf of others.214 Specifically, companies are encouraged to adopt policies
that ‘require that the individual submitting the Biological Sample or the Genetic Data
is the owner or include reasonable steps to ensure that consent has been obtained from
the owner of the Biological Sample or Genetic Data.’215 It remains to be seen whether
DTC companies, particularly those that permit or even encourage consumers to sur-
reptitiously submit samples as a key component of their businessmodel, will adopt this
practice, and if theydo,what steps theywill take to ensure that the individual submitting
the sample has obtained consent to do so.
Surreptitious testing by law enforcement agencies also raises privacy concerns, an
issue that has gained renewed attention in the wake of revelations surrounding the ar-
rest of the suspected Golden State Killer. 216 After homing in on the suspect using fa-
milial searching of an open-access genealogy website, investigators were able to verify
his identity by analysing DNA surreptitiously collected from a car door handle, taken
while the suspect shopped, and later from a discarded tissue found in the trash outside
of his home. While it appears that investigators in this case obtained a court order be-
fore performing this surreptitious testing (although not before searching the genealogy
website), police in many jurisdictions are not required to seek approval from a court
before engaging in this practice.217
212 Id.
213 See, eg Peerenboom v. Perlmutter, No. 2013-CA-015257 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 23, 2017); Roberts, supra note
102, at 1109–1110 (discussing Pereenboom, a highly publicized, ongoing case originating in Florida involv-
ing a claim of conversion for surreptitious testing). In Peerenboom, Isaac and Laura Perlmutter sued Harold
Peerenboom for conversion, among other things. They alleged that Peerenboom conspired to obtain their
genetic material as part of a scheme to retaliate against the Perlmutters in a neighborhood dispute. The Perl-
mutters asserted that they ‘have an exclusive right of possession and ownership of the genetic information en-
coded in their geneticmaterial’ and that ‘[b]y collecting, analyzing, and testing their geneticmaterial to obtain
the Perlmutters’ confidential genetic information, Conspirators exercised an act of dominion and authority
that deprived the Perlmutters of their rights of ownership, possession, control, and privacy’. Responding to
a motion to dismiss from Peerenboom, the trial court found that the Perlmutters enjoyed a property right in
their genetic information, sufficient to state a claim for conversion. Roberts, supra note 102, at 1109–1110
(citations omitted).
214 FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM, supra note 111, at 4–5.
215 Id. at 4–5.
216 Nancy Dillon, Golden State Killer Suspect Arrested After Cops Swiped His DNA from Car Door Handle
and Tissue, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 1, 2018), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/ny-news-golden-
state-killer-dna-collected-car-door-trash-20180601-story.html (accessed Apr. 15, 2019).
217 Albert E. Scherr,Genetic Privacy and the FourthAmendment:Unregulated SurreptitiousDNAHarvesting, 47GA.
L. REV. 445, 525 (2013).
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Police have this freedom because the state laws that place restrictions on surrepti-
tious testing generally do not apply to surreptitious forensic testing,218 and the Fourth
Amendment has thus far provided little protection in the context of surreptitious ge-
netic testing by law enforcement. Although the Supreme Court has not specifically
ruledon the issueof surreptitious genetic testing, it has established that individuals have
no reasonable expectation of privacy in abandoned property.219 While several states
have held that placing items for trash pickup does not amount to a complete abandon-
ment of any interest in the contents,220 police can engage in surreptitious DNA collec-
tion and analysis without a warrant or a court order in most circumstances.221 In the
absence of constitutional or statutory prohibitions, the prevalence of surreptitious test-
ing by law enforcement will only continue to increase.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have focused primarily on issues of genetic privacy in the context of
healthcare, but our analysis necessarily addresses health informationmore generally as
well. A lot of health information provides insights or at least clues into the individual’s
genetic makeup, so that the two cannot readily be separated.Moreover, a person’s cur-
rent condition or phenotype can be more pertinent to privacy concerns than his or her
genes.Thus, treating genetic data as exceptional, as deserving special protection, is gen-
erally unwarranted and in many cases not achievable or even counterproductive.222
Concerns about genetic privacy and health information privacy more broadly fall
into two large categories—the ability to control where data about individuals go and
the extent to which individuals can be assured that data about them will not be used to
cause them harm.223 Our analysis, which focuses on the role of law, goes primarily to
the question of howmuch control people have, and concludes that control is limited in
many ways. In the healthcare system, patients are asked to sign an acknowledgement
of a covered entity’s notice of privacy practices when they seek care, which may lead
themtobelieve that their healthprivacy is vigorously protected, but the law’s protection
may be illusory. The HIPAA Privacy Rule has numerous exceptions permitting access
to individually identifiable health information, which reflect policy trade-offs between
individual control and social uses. But until recently, even when these exceptions were
218 Id.
219 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988) (holding there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
for garbage left at curbside).
220 State v. Tanaka, 701 P.2d 1274, 1276-77 (Haw. 1985) (stating that ‘[p]eople reasonably believe that police
will not indiscriminately rummage through their trash bags to discover their personal effects’); State v. Goss,
834A.2d316, 317-19 (N.H. 2003) (holding therewas a reasonable expectationof privacy inblackplastic trash
bags in driveways on trash days); State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 800-02 (N.J. 1990) (suppressing evidence
fromsearchofwhite plastic trashbags inplastic garbage in frontof house); State v.Morris, 680A.2d90, 94 (Vt.
1996) (holding warrant needed to search secure opaque bags left for pickup). Contra People v. Hillman, 834
P.2d 1271, 1276 (Colo. 1992) (holding society does not recognize ‘as reasonable an expectation of privacy in
garbage left adjacent to a public sidewalk for collection’); Commonwealth v. Pratt, 555 N.E.2d 559, 567-68
(Mass. 1990) (holding no reasonable expectation of privacy in trash left for collection); State v. Carriere, 545
N.W.2d 773, 776 (N.D. 1996) (same).
221 See Scherr, supra note 217. See also Joh, supra note 205, at 696.
222 See Part II-B.
223 Clayton et al., supra note 13, at 17.
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invoked, there was little risk that genetic information would be shared because person-
ally identified health information rarely contained much genetic data.
One incontestable fact is that the landscape is evolving asmore genetic and genomic
data are becoming available.Within the healthcare system,more genetic tests are com-
ing into clinical use, increasingly using broad-based platforms with the capacity to un-
cover variants potentially pertinent to conditions beyond the initial clinical indication.
Although healthcare institutions have and will continue to have strong incentives to
protect patients’ information due to the increasing emphasis on transparency and trust,
once in the patient’s medical record a wide range of entities may be granted access to
genetic information pursuant to broad regulatory exceptions under theHIPAAPrivacy
Rule.224 In addition, millions of people are compelled every year to provide unlimited
access to their health information for various uses, such as insurance and commercial
transactions.225 To the extent that these data become available outside healthcare in-
stitutions (ieHIPAA covered entities), it loses even the little protection afforded by the
HIPAA Privacy Rule, creating the possibility for harm or misuse by an array of down-
stream actors.
A crucial change in the ecology of genetic information is the emergence of DTC
genetic testing and interpretation, so far used bymillions of people and largely escaping
regulation, except in some cases when these companies offer to provide health-related
results. The most common use by far is to explore one’s ancestral origins and to find
relatives.The latter use necessarily requires identifiable genetic information in order to
make or disprove relationships. The most prominent of these companies have explicit
privacy policies and usually require people to give permission before they are placed in
contactwith a putative relative.226 Others say little or nothing at all about privacy.Many
companies encourage surreptitious testing. Clearly, there is room here to require more
robust privacy policies that allow people to decide whether they want to communicate
with a purported relative and to forbid surreptitious testing.
One of the most significant challenges is that many people take genetic data about
themselves, which they often received from DTC companies, and post them online in
an identifiable form to find their relatives, to sharewith other peoplewith similar condi-
tions, or to promote research.These actions necessarily reveal information about their
relatives, as has beenmade clear by the use of GEDMatch to identity criminal suspects.
At present, a person has no ability to prevent his or her relatives from revealing their
own information. Moreover, there are no limits on who can access these data or for
what purpose.
Our research has demonstrated that increasing amounts of genetic information are
generated, analysed, shared, and stored by diverse individuals and entities.TheHIPAA
Privacy Rule was never intended to afford comprehensive health privacy protection.
Even when health information is stored at compliant healthcare institutions, the com-
bination of broad exceptions and compelled disclosures precludes informational health
privacy.
At the same time that genetic information is flowing through covered entities’ sieve-
like regulatory structures, many other entities that obtain sensitive health information
224 See Part V-A.
225 See Part V-B.
226 Hazel & Slobogin, supra note 88, at 21.
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are unregulated. The latter group varies widely in the extent to which they are likely to
protect data about a person, which depends on their motives and business models.
Other disclosures of genetic information occur when individuals voluntarily make
their identified genomic data public; inmany cases, people do this without considering
or regardless of the impact on themselves or their relatives. There is little that can be
done to prevent these voluntary disclosures except to ensure that individuals are aware
of the possible consequences.
Our overview of the law of genetic privacy has been quite sobering. Although some
opportunities exist to increase individual control over disclosures thatmay affect them,
these situations are limited. Thus, it may be time to shift attention from attempting to
control access to genetic information to considering the more challenging question of
how these data can be used and under what conditions, explicitly addressing trade-offs
between individual and social goods in numerous applications. The first step to mean-
ingful protection of genetic privacymay be the societal recognition that health privacy,
including genetic privacy, is now largely a mirage.
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